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ABSTRACT 
Originalism has a difficult relationship with race and gender.  People of color and white women were largely 
absent from the process of drafting and ratifying the Constitution.  Today, self-described originalists are 
overwhelmingly white men.  In light of these realities, can originalism solve its “race and gender” problems 
while continuing to be originalist?  This Article argues that originalists can take several actions today to address 
originalism’s race and gender problems, including debiasing present-day interpretation, looking to historical 
sources authored by people of color and white women, and severing originalism and the Constitution’s text from 
their historical associations with racism and sexism.  Taking these steps will not only make originalism more 
inclusive, but also help originalists become better at accessing the original meaning of the Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Originalism has a difficult relationship with race and gender.  Jamal 
Greene wonders “whether African-Americans have especially good reason 
to reject originalism.”1  Jerome Culp, Jr. argued that “[a]lmost all notions 
of originalism are subject to the criticism that they ask black concerns to 
defer to white concerns. . . .  ‘Defer to the past’ is the implicit message.  
Listen to the wiser and greater (and whiter) founders.”2  Mary Anne Case 
similarly concluded that “no version of original meaning . . . holds much 
promise for yielding what Abigail Adams demanded of John—a 
constitutionally mandated code of laws more ‘generous and favorable to 
women’ than the one the Framers inherited.”3 
Beyond these concerns about the substantive content of originalist 
interpretation, the scholars who most actively engage with originalism also 
tend to be a visually homogenous group.  At the 2017 Originalism Works-
in-Progress conference,4 non-originalist scholar Richard Primus tweeted 
before the first panel, “At a conference on originalism.  Nice people here.  I 
count 31 around the table.  29 men; 28 white men.”5  Primus’s observation 
 
 1 Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENVER L. REV. 517, 517 (2011). 
 2 Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 39, 75.   
 3 Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? Forget About Them.  A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29 
CONST. COMMENT. 431, 445 (2014).  
 4 Eighth Annual Hugh & Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference, U. SAN 
DIEGO, https://www.sandiego.edu/law/centers/csco/detail.php?_focus=55335 (last visited Nov. 
14, 2018).  
 5 Richard Primus (@Richard_Primus), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2017, 2:41 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Richard_Primus/status/832721572280430592.  Although a few additional 
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feeds into another longstanding, indirect critique of originalism as an 
interpretive methodology: that it is a methodology developed by white men, 
that primarily attracts white men, and that, res ipsa loquitur, there must be 
something wrong with originalism if this is the population it attracts. 
These critiques of originalism are perennial, and continue to resonate, 
because there are elements of truth to them.  And yet, little work has been 
done to try to resolve originalism’s race and gender problem, in large part 
because it is difficult to imagine how an interpretive methodology could do 
so while still being “originalist.”  
Accordingly, this Article asks whether originalism can address its 
relationship with race and gender while maintaining its commitment to the 
fixation principle—the principle that a constitutional provision’s meaning 
was fixed at the time of its adoption.6  Addressing this question necessitates 
teasing apart what specifically originalism’s race and gender problem is—or 
more precisely, what those problems are.  When concerns are genuinely 
understood and appreciated, opportunities to resolve the tension between 
originalism and its lack of diversity can emerge—on originalism’s own 
terms, and according to its own values. 
This Article proceeds in two main pieces.  Part I isolates several 
interlocking but distinct concerns one might have about originalism’s 
relationship to women and people of color.  Part II evaluates what 
originalists might do to address the articulated concerns.   
When proceeding, this Article makes certain limited presumptions 
about the nature of language and communication.  Specifically, this Article 
presumes that language is not always wholly and insolubly indeterminate, 
and that there is some threshold of evidence which can satisfactorily 
demonstrate that particular pieces of language had some communicative 
content to a specific audience at a particular time.  Language may often be 
under-determinate or open-textured, or be interpreted in different ways by 
different people; evidence about how a term or phrase was understood 
historically sometimes may also be too limited to draw convincing 
conclusions.  Additionally, present-day interpreters may have conscious or 
unconscious biases that may distort their views of historic understanding.  
Nonetheless, this Article presumes that because language in general, and 
 
participants, including women and people of color, arrived after the tweet was sent, Primus’s 
observation accurately captured the general demographic character of the room. 
 6 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when each provision is 
framed and ratified: this claim can be called the Fixation Thesis.  This thesis is one of two core ideas 
of originalist constitutional theory . . . .”). 
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the Constitution specifically, has some communicative content, originalist 
interpretation is possible.  As a result, substantive discussion of whether 
language is radically indeterminate will be left to the side, both because the 
topic has been addressed elsewhere7 and because its scope goes beyond the 
subject of diversity and representation in originalism. 
I.  ORIGINALISM’S DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS 
Originalism’s problem with race and gender is perhaps better 
characterized as several problems—overlapping concerns with the 
Constitution’s origins, founding-era content, and modern-day 
interpretation.  In order to better understand the concerns at issue, this Part 
first works to isolate and understand each potential problem on its own, 
and then describes how each problem interacts with one other.  Loosely 
speaking, the concerns can be divided into two broad categories: concerns 
over substantive outcomes of applying originalist methodology, and non-
consequentialist concerns about the origins of the Constitution or with 
originalism’s political associations.  Within these categories, objections 
break down into further subcategories.  A belief that originalism’s 
application will lead to undesirable outcomes could be a belief that 
correctly-executed originalist interpretation will yield bad results, but it 
could also be a belief that the interpretation will be manipulated, 
consciously or unconsciously, by one’s political opponents to achieve their 
preferred results, regardless of whether correctly-executed originalist 
interpretation would provide the same answer.  In theory, one might 
further wonder if one is following originalist methodology correctly but 
arriving at mistaken conclusions because of unrepresentative evidence.  As 
Saul Cornell has argued about the elision of non-elite interpreters from 
originalist discourse,8 studying the discourse of lower-class Americans, 
women, and minorities might reveal that the white, elite men whose 
writings are most commonly consulted sometimes interpreted the 
Constitution differently than other sub-communities.  
 
 7 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
462, 476–84 (1987) (discussing the indeterminacy thesis). 
 8 See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the 
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 303–04 (2011) (“When one moves 
beyond the debate between elite Federalists and Anti-Federalists, or Jefferson and Hamilton’s 
arguments over strict and loose construction, a much more fundamental division within the 
Founding generation becomes visible: a conflict between elite and popular approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.  Only when this aspect of the Founding debate is restored to its 
prominence can we begin to understand the dynamics of the original debate over Originalism.”). 
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Besides concerns about the substantive applications of originalist 
interpretation, some concerns about originalist interpretation are decidedly 
non-consequentialist.  These concerns largely relate to the political 
legitimacy of following originalist methodology—whether the “dead hand” 
of the founding generation can bind the living public today, generally, or 
whether a group of historic actors perceived as unrepresentative of the past 
or present-day population can legitimately bind future generations, 
specifically.  Distinct from concerns about political legitimacy are concerns 
about the Constitution’s founding-era associations with slavery and black 
oppression, and about the alienation experienced by populations that feel 
disenfranchised by and external to America’s origin myth and narrative.   
While this Part draws apart each of these concerns individually, 
empirically they frequently occur together and reinforce each other.  
Nonetheless, by conceptually clarifying what each concern consists of, it 
will be easier to identify the extent to which these concerns are redressable 
and how that redress may be achieved. 
A.  Adverse Outcomes 
1.  Outcomes Necessitated by Originalism 
One of the most straightforward demographic concerns about 
originalism is that originalist interpretation fails to advance the interests or 
reach the preferred outcomes of women and people of color.9  At the onset, 
this worry has the potential to overgeneralize the views of these 
populations.  While there are many political issues about which there is 
significant agreement within particular populations, there also exists a 
variety of diverse viewpoints, particularly as policy questions gain 
complexity or as questions get more specific.  Nonetheless, as Greene 
observes, “[I]f we believe that originalism in particular is identified with 
outcomes that African-Americans tend not to support, then we have a 
simple explanation for why African-Americans might not have warm 
feelings toward originalism.”10  Ditto for other people of color and white 
women. 
 
 9 More generally, this objection has been raised without a demographic context several times. See, 
e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 857, 898–912 (2009) (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME 
RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 63–65, 75, 81–150, 199–252 (2005)) 
(responding to Sunstein’s critique of originalism). 
 10 Greene, supra note 1, at 517–18. 
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The concern that originalism leads to unpalatable outcomes has 
sparked several scholarly efforts to explain why originalist methodologies do 
lead to just results.  Michael McConnell advanced the position that Brown v. 
Board of Education was justified on originalist grounds.11  Although at the 
time “countless” others had disagreed with his conclusion, Steven G. 
Calabresi and Michael W. Perl later claimed McConnell had “the better of 
the argument.”12  David Upham, as well as Calabresi and Andrea 
Matthews, have argued that the holding of Loving v. Virginia can be reached 
by originalist methods.13  William Eskridge, and Calabresi and Hannah 
Begley, similarly argued that constitutional protection for same-sex 
marriage could be derived from an originalist interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.14  Their arguments appeared in an amicus brief for 
Obergefell v. Hodges,15 although Justice Kennedy’s majority decided the case 
on different grounds.  Calabresi and Julia Rickert have also mounted an 
originalist case in favor of constitutional protection against sexual 
discrimination.16  
Other originalists have been less concerned that the Constitution might 
fail to protect certain rights or necessitate particular, desirable outcomes.17  
 
 11 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953 (1995) 
(“Parts II and III then demonstrate that the belief that school segregation does in fact violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment was held during the years immediately following ratification by a 
substantial majority of political leaders who had supported the Amendment.” (footnote omitted)); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 1937, 1937–38 (1995) (responding to criticism of the argument set forth in Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions). 
 12 Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 2014 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 432. 
 13 Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 
1393; David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 216 (2015) (summarizing historical evidence that supports 
the Court’s holding in Loving).  
 14 See Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
648, 649 (2016) (offering originalist justification for Justice Kennedy’s opinion); William N. Eskridge 
Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2015) (“While the drafters of 
the Equal Protection Clause had no ‘expectations’ that states in 1868 would have to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples . . . the state cannot create a caste regime arbitrarily marking a whole 
class of worthy persons as outside the normal protections of the law.”). 
 15 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute et al. in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -574) (arguing that originalism 
supported a constitutional interpretation that protected same-sex marriage). 
 16 Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(2011) (arguing that an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex). 
 17 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117–33, 245 (1977); Alfred Avins, De Facto and De Jure School 
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Justice Scalia, for instance, claimed the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
provide protections against sex discrimination, but that legislatures could 
create whatever important protections the Constitution failed to provide.  
When asked about the topic, he explained, 
[I]f indeed the current society has come to different views, that’s fine.  You 
do not need the Constitution to reflect the wishes of the current society.  
Certainly, the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of 
sex. . . .  If the current society wants to outlaw discrimination by sex, hey 
we have things called legislatures, and they enact things called laws.  You 
don’t need a constitution to keep things up-to-date.  All you need is a 
legislature and a ballot box.18  
Justice Scalia’s observation may be satisfying when a position holds 
sway over a majority of the population, but where a position merely 
commands a sizeable minority of the population’s views, that minority—
justifiably or unjustifiably—often looks to the courts to address its problems 
and advance its interests.  As a result, whether originalism yields particular 
results remains important to anyone whose position may not command a 
majority, but who places great weight on the government protecting a 
certain interest.19  
Ultimately, the weight of the concern that originalism does not yield 
satisfactory or sufficiently desirable results for women and people of color is 
contingent on facts about the world—on the actual interests of many 
women and people of color, and on the substantive outcomes of applying 
 
Segregation: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 38 MISS. L.J. 
179, 226 (1967). 
 18 Interview by Calvin Massey with Antonin Scalia, CAL. LAWYER (Jan. 2011), 
http://legacy.callawyer.com/2011/01/antonin-scalia/ (cited in Case, supra note 3, at 447 n.66).  
Notably, a few years later, Justice Scalia seemed to suggest the government still could not 
arbitrarily discriminate against women under the Constitution.  “No, you can’t treat women 
differently, give them higher criminal sentences.  Of course not. . . .  The issue is, ‘What is 
discrimination?’  If there’s a reasonable basis for not letting women do something—like going into 
combat or whatnot.”  Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.  Mary Ann Case points out the 
challenges of identifying the “reasonable basis” Justice Scalia referred to.  “[I]n many states for 
much of U.S. history, women were indeed treated differently in criminal sentencing and given 
higher sentences, for example under statutes that provided indeterminate sentences for them, and 
shorter fixed sentences for men.”  Case, supra note 3, at 447 n. 67; see also Paula C. Johnson, At the 
Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 28 (1995) (cited in Case, supra note 3, at 447 n. 67) (“Courts justified legislative 
distinctions which imposed longer sentences on women than men as reasonable in view of the 
state’s purpose of providing more effective rehabilitation for women.”).  
 19 Additionally, the content of originalist interpretation remains important to those holding majority 
positions, as courts may also prevent majority-approved government action they deem 
unconstitutional.  
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an originalist methodology to legal questions.20 And to a point, some 
conclusions perceived to be “bad” results may be outweighed by other 
values.  For example, one may believe that originalist interpretation is 
required by our law currently,21 is necessary or conducive for government 
by “rule of law,” is the most legitimate way of interpreting our Constitution, 
produces the best outcomes overall (though not in every single case),22 or 
constrains the tyrannical impulses of political and governmental actors.  
Nonetheless, concerns that originalism leads to unjust results are 
understandable reasons for someone to oppose it. 
2.  Conscious Manipulation 
One might also be wary of originalism, not because of what accurate 
interpretation would yield, but because one worries that present-day 
interpreters have or will misread evidence to favor views that they prefer.  
This concern is especially resonant with some because of originalism’s 
origins. 
Originalism gained adherents and momentum as a reaction to the 
perceived excesses of the Warren Court, whose decisions were seen by 
many Republicans and conservative scholars as untethered to the text of 
the written Constitution and as inappropriately expanding the role of the 
judiciary.23  Writing in 2006, Reva Siegel and Robert Post expressed 
 
 20 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 1, at 517–18 (“[The conclusion that African-Americans tend not to be 
originalists because originalism breeds undesirable outcomes for the social group] is contingent on 
a set of assumptions about African-American political views and about the actual or perceived 
substantive outcomes originalism entails.”). 
 21 See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2391 (2015) (“[W]hen you 
look at our current legal commitments, as a whole, they can be reconciled with originalism.  
Indeed, not only can they be reconciled, but originalism seems to best describe our current law.”); 
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 818–19 
(2015) (“To an originalist . . . [w]hatever rules of law we had at the Founding, we still have today, 
unless something legally relevant happened to change them.  Our law happens to consist of their 
law . . . .  Preserving the meaning of the Founders’ words is important, but it’s not an end in 
itself.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 22 See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 2 (2013) (“We argue that originalism advances the welfare of the present-day 
citizens of the United States because it promotes constitutional interpretations that are likely to 
have better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist theories.”). 
 23 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A 
SOURCEBOOK 4 (1987) (“[I]f the courts go beyond the original meaning of the Constitution . . . 
they usurp powers not given to them by the people.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a 
Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545 n.3 (2006) (citing 
originalist allegations that the Warren Court committed “judicial usurpation”); Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601 (2004) (describing 
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incredulity over Edwin Meese’s claim that a “jurisprudence of original 
intention [was] necessary to preserve constitutional law from 
politicization.”24  Describing originalism as “an ideology that inspires 
political mobilization and engagement,” Siegel and Post painted a highly 
politicized picture of the first wave of originalism.25  “[O]riginalism gave 
conservative activists a language in which to attack the progressive case law 
of the Warren Court on the grounds that it had ‘almost nothing to do with 
the Constitution’ and was merely an effort to enact ‘the political agenda of 
the American left.’”26  In addition to accusing originalism of being 
outcome-oriented, Siegel and Post charged that Reagan-era originalism 
opportunistically “ignored elements of the original understanding that [did] 
not resonate with contemporary conservative commitments,”27 particularly 
those which would lead to exceedingly unpopular or unjust results.  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia described himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist,28 although 
he later backed down from that description.29  Post and Siegel emphasized 
that “[n]o one paid any attention”30 when Lino Graglia argued that 
because “the fifth amendment . . . was adopted in 1791 as part of a 
Constitution that explicitly and repeatedly provided for slavery,” it 
therefore did not forbid racial segregation in schools in the District of 
Columbia.31  But if originalists de-emphasized conclusions they disliked, 
 
originalism as a reaction to the Warren and Burger courts); Raoul Berger, The Imperial Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1977, at 38 (“The Supreme Court . . . has usurped legislative powers that the 
framers reserved to the states . . . .”). 
 24 Post & Siegel, supra note 23, at 554; see also Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 22, 29 (1985) (“A jurisprudence based on first principles is neither conservative 
nor liberal, neither right nor left.  It is a jurisprudence that cares about committing and limiting to 
each organ of government the proper ambit of responsibilities.  It is a jurisprudence faithful to our 
Constitution.”).  
 25 Post & Siegel, supra note 23, at 554. 
 26 Id. at 555 (quoting Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme 
Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 789 (1987)). 
 27 Id. at 558. 
 28 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
 29 See Senior, supra note 18 (“You’ve described yourself as a fainthearted originalist.  But really, how 
fainthearted?”  “I described myself as that a long time ago.  I repudiate that.” “So you’re a 
stouthearted one.”  “I try to be.  I try to be an honest originalist!  I will take the bitter with the 
sweet!”); see also MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION 165 (2013) ( “But then Scalia confessed that ‘in a crunch I may prove a faint-
hearted originalist.’”). 
 30 Post & Siegel, supra note 23, at 558. 
 31 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Graglia, supra note 26, at 796).  Recall that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses on their terms only apply to the states.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
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and drew attention to outcomes they did, their choices opened originalism 
up to being criticized as a cover for results-oriented reasoning. 
Originalism has changed significantly since its politicized debut in the 
1980s, and since Post and Siegel wrote their critique.  Criticisms of original-
intent jurisprudence inspired many originalists to instead interpret the 
Constitution based on how it was understood by the public, rather than by 
the drafters.32  Two later iterations emphasize interpreting constitutional 
language using the “original methods” used to interpret the Constitution33 
and by relying on the law of how to interpret legal texts that existed at the 
time of enactment.34  Many originalists have grown more accepting of and 
comfortable with the notion that some constitutional terms and phrases are 
underdetermined, vague, ambiguous, or open-textured.35  And rather than 
using originalism to justify judicial minimalism, originalists like Randy 
Barnett emphasize the importance of the Ninth Amendment’s protections 
of unenumerated rights retained by the people.36 
Nonetheless, despite originalism’s evolution, individuals who consider 
themselves left-of-center remain wary of it in light of its origins.  For every 
originalist who agrees with Barnett’s characterization of the Ninth 
Amendment, there is another like Robert Bork who thinks the Ninth 
Amendment might be an “inkblot.”37  While one could understand this sort 
 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 629 (1999). 
 33 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22. 
 34 See William Baude & Steven E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017). 
 35 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 6, at 5 (“Some new originalists (those who accepted the interpretation-
construction distinction and also believed that the Constitution contains some provisions that are 
vague or open textured) were led to the conclusion that the original meaning of the constitutional 
text does not fully determine the answers to all constitutional questions.”). 
 36 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
254 (2004) (“The Ninth Amendment mandates that unenumerated rights be treated the same as 
those that are listed. . . .  [T]he doctrine currently in place . . . fails to provide the equal protection 
of liberties required by the Ninth Amendment.  It is a construction that runs afoul of the 
text . . . .”). 
 37 More specifically, Bork said in his confirmation hearing:  
I do not think you can use the [N]inth [A]mendment unless you know something of 
what it means.  For example, if you had an amendment that says, “Congress shall make 
no” and then there is an ink blot, and you cannot read the rest of it and that is the only 
copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot if 
you cannot read it.  
  14 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL 
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE 1916–1987, at 249 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1990); see also 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
166 (1990) (“A provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision that is 
written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot.  No judge is entitled to 
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of disagreement as the sort good-faith difference any interpretive theory can 
yield, some see substantive disagreement among originalists as an indication 
that originalist practice is indeterminate, or at least largely contestable, and 
therefore will be manipulated, as Post and Siegel suggested, to justify 
implementing the interpreter’s agenda.38 
From this perspective, concerns about adverse outcomes are as much 
about the present-day as they are about the past.  In other words, yes, one 
might worry that originalism will fail to advance or protect the interests of 
particular populations because the Constitution’s drafters actually chose not 
to advance or protect those interests.  But just as importantly, a skeptic of 
originalism might be even more concerned that originalism’s advocates are 
abusing their ability to selectively appeal to the constitutional text, in order 
to reach their preferred outcomes today. 
3.  Unconscious Bias 
The previous section explored the concern that originalism might not 
only happen to reach outcomes unpopular with particular populations, but in 
fact be designed to do just that—to restore an American vision that, while 
appealing to some, is experienced by others as hostile to their interests.  
This picture of originalism painted by Siegel and Post is an intentional one, 
depicting the “first wave” of originalism as a movement developed largely 
in response to the Warren Court’s apparent indifference to the 
constitutional text and structure, with the goal of reversing it. 
But the originalism of the 2010s is a very different creature than it was 
thirty years ago.  On the one hand, originalism has evolved in response to 
criticism, focusing more on the communicative content of the constitutional 
text during the founding era, rather than on the drafters’ intentions about 
how the text would be applied.  Originalism is also a somewhat larger tent: 
if you believe the meaning of the Constitution was fixed in the founding 
era, and that meaning constrains government actors today, you can call 
yourself an originalist.  (Under that broad and quite moderate-sounding 
definition, it would seem many more people would qualify as originalists 
 
interpret an ink blot on the ground that there must be something under it.”). 
 38 Indeed, Jeffrey Rosen indirectly made this charge against Justice Scalia in 1997.  “Scalia deserves 
respect for having redefined the mainstream of constitutional discourse, and in a substantially 
useful way.  But having abandoned the pose of judicial neutrality, Scalia has now transformed 
himself into a passionate advocate for traditional values rather than a dispassionate guardian of 
the constitutional text.” Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, NEW REPUBLIC (May 5, 1997), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/74152/originalist-sin. 
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than have affirmatively adopted the label.)  Even Jack Balkin, a figure in the 
critical legal studies movement, chooses to characterize his constitutional 
methodology as originalist in nature.39  The Constitutional Accountability 
Center in Washington, D.C., describes itself as practicing “honest 
textualism and principled originalism”40 in order to “fulfill[ ] the progressive 
promise of our Constitution’s text and history.”41  While the majority of 
self-described originalists would probably not suppose the originalist’s 
Constitution leads to particularly progressive outcomes, it remains true that 
several of the emerging “new originalist” writings are more explicitly 
concerned with developing a more reliable and justified method of legal 
and constitutional interpretation than with advancing particular policy 
outcomes.42  Originalism remains a theory of constitutional change, which 
gives credence to arguments for abandoning judicial precedent that 
deviates, or deviates too far, from what the Constitution requires.43  
However, despite its prominence in the Reagan administration, most 
originalists would be offended at the insinuation that their goals were to 
manipulate legal and popular discourse in order to unprincipledly advance 
a conservative policy agenda.  Indeed, the great efforts to formalize 
originalist methodology and respond to critics represent a self-conscious 
attempt to establish originalism as a compelling and coherent theory of 
constitutional interpretation, rather than as a shorthand for a set of 
substantive policy positions.44 
 
 39 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 40 What Is Constitutional Accountability?, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (June 1, 2008), 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/blog/what-is-constitutional-accountability/. 
 41 About the Constitutional Accountability Center, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/about-cac/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
 42 See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22, at 2; Baude & Sachs, supra note 34; Solum, supra 
note 6; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 
(2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 43 See H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 IOWA L. REV. 
1427, 1433 (1986) (“Just as in a scriptural religion, the most elaborate and established theological 
system can be challenged by the call ad fontes (‘back to the sources’); so in American constitutional 
law it is always possible to go back to the text, to challenge what currently is[,] in the name of 
what once was written.”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. 
L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1989) (“The Constitution has a radical potential to disrupt our constitutional 
practice in part because the principles that animated the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution can prompt us to change our own understanding of constitutional meaning.”); id. at 
1627 (“Just as Martin Luther initiated the transformation of religious practice by confronting the 
Church with its origins, so, too, the text of the Constitution and evidence of its original meaning 
can serve as the linchpin of a transformative politics.”). 
 44 In 1989, Larry Solum contrasted what he hoped the direction of the originalist enterprise would 
be with Richard Nixon’s call for “strict construction” of the Constitution. See Solum, supra note 
43, at 1601 (“As originalism has been modified and defined in reaction to nonoriginalist critiques, 
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Even if we agree that the overwhelming majority of originalists are 
intellectually honest and well-intentioned, there are still some fair concerns 
to raise about the potential for originalists to unconsciously evaluate 
originalist evidence to reach the results they prefer, or to comport with their 
existing expectations.  Compared to the rest of the legal academic 
community, originalists tend to hold conservative or libertarian political 
philosophies, tend to be white, and tend to be male.  Tendency is, of 
course, not absolute uniformity; most notably, Justice Clarence Thomas is 
African-American and is undoubtedly one of the most influential 
originalists of all time.  But the reality that originalists are a somewhat 
homogenous population—at least on these axes—creates the potential for 
originalist interpretation as practiced to be unwillingly distorted.  Many 
originalists see constitutional interpretation as a two-part inquiry: first to 
discover the semantic or communicative content of the Constitution’s text 
at the time of the founding, and second to determine or decide the legal 
effect of the text in a given situation.45  The process of discovering the 
communicative content of the Constitution’s text is meant to be an 
objective and descriptive endeavor.46  Yet, the homogeneity of the current 
population of originalists creates the potential for unnoticed and shared 
distortions, because modern-day interpreters may be more likely to share 
expectations and preferences with each other, due to having had similar life 
experiences. 
In this sense, originalism’s reputation as white, male, and conservative, 
libertarian, or Republican may create self-perpetuating effects.  By 
accidentally projecting one’s own concerns onto the founding generation, 
interpretations of the Constitution’s meaning may come to reflect not only 
 
the originalist’s position has become more and more plausible as a theory of constitutional 
interpretation.”); id. (“‘[S]trict construction’ . . . is now recognized as a virtually meaningless 
phrase.  It was never more than a rallying cry for a set of positions on a number of distinct 
constitutional issues; ‘strict construction’ represents no coherent theory or principle of 
constitutional interpretation today.”).  
 45 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) 
(“What defines originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation is the belief that (a) the 
semantic meaning of the written Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment, and that (b) this 
meaning should be followed by constitutional actors until it is properly changed by a written 
amendment.” (footnote omitted)); Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 42, at 101 
(“Constitutional interpretation yields the semantic content of the Constitution. . .   [and] all of these 
[interpretive] theories aim at the recovery of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text.”).  
 46 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 42, at 99–100 (“[T]he linguistic 
meaning of a text is a fact about the world.  The meaning of written or oral communication is 
determined by a set of facts: these facts include the characteristics of the utterance itself . . . and by 
facts about linguistic practice . . . .  The linguistic meaning of an utterance cannot be settled by 
arguments of morality or political theory.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the views of the Founders, but of those observing the Founders today.  
Ironically, the absence of more diverse populations within the originalist 
enterprise may compound this effect.  More diverse populations working to 
reveal the meaning of constitutional text would bring their own worldview 
and unconscious biases to the process, and a dialogue among individuals 
with a variety of life experiences and expectations may be more likely to 
correctly distinguish between founding-era meaning and unconscious 
projection of present-day values, expectations, or concerns.  
4.  Unrepresentative Evidence 
One might finally worry that an originalist could be well-intentioned 
and unbiased, but nonetheless be thwarted in their efforts to discover the 
original public meaning of the Constitution because the available evidence 
was not representative of the general public.  The overwhelming majority 
of evidence of original meaning comes from the speech and writings of elite 
white men—largely because the Constitution was itself written by elite 
white men, and because elite white men produced most published writing, 
and the most writing about the Constitution in the founding era.  To the 
extent that white women and people of color interpreted the Constitution 
differently, those interpretations are less likely to have been recorded and 
identified.  Moreover, the writings of white women and people of color that 
did address the Constitution have largely escaped attention, as efforts to 
identify and categorize writings about the Constitution have generally 
focused on the most influential public actors in the founding period.  As a 
result, even a well-intentioned and entirely unbiased present-day originalist 
may err in evaluating the original public meaning of the Constitution, 
because the meaning understood by large portions of the public does not 
appear prominently in the accessible or existing historical record.47 
B.  Non-consequentialist Concerns  
Arguments that originalism compels, for instance, protection of same-sex 
marriage or desegregation, appear to do little to alter the composition of 
 
 47 The extent to which this concern resonates depends on two foundational elements.  One has to 
believe that it is relevant to the “original meaning” how actual members of the founding public 
understood the constitutional text, as contrasted to how a “reasonable” member of the public, or 
with a lawyer, understood it.  Additionally, one has to believe that multiple communities may 
have existed within the whole founding-era public, which either differed in how they used and 
understood language generally, or differed in how they interpreted the Constitution specifically.  
Both of these issues are explored further in subsequent sections.  See infra Section II.A.  
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adherents to an originalist methodology.  Indeed, despite the obvious 
relevance of substantive outcome, originalism’s results may not play as 
dominant a role in whether one subscribes to it as one might expect.  Two of 
the most crisply shared “originalism conversion” stories are not primarily 
about reaching particular legal outcomes.  Randy Barnett states that his 
support for following the Constitution’s publicly accessible, written meaning 
was significantly inspired by similar concepts in contract law—after he had 
initially rejected “original intent” originalism, and the notion that the 
Drafters’ intentions could be controlling even if the public was unaware of 
them.48  The interpretive methods underpinning Lysander Spooner’s anti-
slavery reading of the Constitution also played a significant role in 
developing Barnett’s perspective.49  Jack Balkin developed and adopted what 
he terms “living originalism” or “framework originalism,” in some part after 
becoming disenchanted with what he viewed as unnecessary hostility 
towards the constitutional text by those seeking progressive legal outcomes.50  
There are several reasons why originalism would not easily gain or lose 
adherents based on the content of new research and argument about what 
outcomes originalism compels (although McConnell’s defense of Brown 
certainly made it more comfortable to call oneself an originalist).  One 
possibility is lack of diffusion of originalist scholarship—many people may 
have a vague sense of what originalism is, but few keep up with the 
literature.  Another may be that many non-originalist legal thinkers are 
more committed to general principles and methods, rather than to 
particular outcomes—principles including ideas that legal institutions are 
for the living to design, or must be designed by a group representative of 
the whole population along certain axes, in order to be legitimate. 
 
 48 See Barnett, supra note 32, at 629 (“I have long denied that I was an originalist because I was largely 
persuaded by the multifaceted critique that has been accepted by so many others.  Now I am 
reconsidering my skepticism.”); id. at 633 (“The Constitution is a law that governs the lawmakers.  
They and those they govern are entitled to rely on the Constitution’s appearances every bit as much 
as parties to private contracts, and for the same reasons.  We cannot read other people’s minds.”). 
 49 See Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s 
Theory of Interpretation, 28 PAC. L.J. 977 (1997). 
 50 See Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 876 (“[M]any 
liberals have assumed an almost instinctive and reflexive posture against ideas like originalism, 
constitutional fidelity and the importance of text, structure, and history.  They have assumed, 
without justification, that the past is against them, that the work of the adopters is incorrigible, 
[and] that the constitutional text is unhelpful if not irrelevant . . . .  Liberal constitutionalists must 
relearn a lesson well understood by Hugo Black: originalism is their friend, not their enemy; and 
the Constitution and its text, its history, and its structure really are on their side.”); id. at 875 (“I 
am attracted to originalism because it reveals things about our protestant constitutional culture 
that liberals, especially, have forgotten.”).  
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Finally, some might be inclined to reject originalist interpretation, not 
because of its substantive content or theoretical legitimacy, but because of 
its associations.  The original Constitution provided for the continuation of 
slavery in the Southern states; many of the Framers were slaveholders 
themselves.  Even though the Reconstruction Amendments rendered 
human bondage unconstitutional and provided legal tools to combat the 
oppressive state and local laws of the Jim Crow era, for some, the taint or 
contamination brought by the evil of slavery remains part of the 
Constitution, like a stain that can’t be washed away, continuing to defile the 
document and whatever stems from it.  More broadly, some are inclined to 
reject originalism because its practice feels alienating.  If someone with your 
characteristics would not have been allowed to meaningfully participate in 
the document’s formation and ratification in the founding era, and if 
present-day originalists do not seem particularly troubled by that fact, one 
can easily internalize the message: this methodology is not for me.  The 
balance of this section breaks each of these concerns apart in more detail. 
1.  The Dead Hand Problem 
One of the most frequently-encountered critiques of originalist 
interpretation stems from general concerns about the “dead hand”51 and 
the nature of “consent of the governed.”52  Most Americans today have 
never explicitly consented to be governed by the Constitution.  Regardless 
of one’s demographic identity, one can question why the values and views 
of dead people should govern living individuals who now exist in a wildly 
different cultural context. 
There are a variety of responses to concerns about whether and when 
governments are legitimate, a full exploration of which would take this 
Article far afield.  Some scholars bend the meaning of consent to find it 
implicitly, through individuals’ participation in political processes or failure 
to exit a governed territory.53  Others argue governments are legitimate if 
they are ones that a rational or reasonable person would have 
 
 51 For further exploration of the dead hand concern, see Paulsen, supra note 9, at 916–18. 
 52 See Greene, supra note 1, at 520 (“[T]o the extent the dead hand problem as I have articulated it is 
a problem, it is not a ‘race’ problem.  The challenge to the democratic representativeness of the 
Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying conventions is one we all share . . . .”).  
 53 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13 (1988) (“[A]ll government rests on the consent, however obtained, of 
the governed.”); see also BARNETT, supra note 36, at 11–25 (criticizing tacit consent or 
acquiescence as a source of political legitimacy).  
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hypothetically consented to.54  Jed Rubenfeld proposes that Americans as a 
people exist in a state of continuity with their past self, and can be bound by 
whatever authority the ratifying generation had.55  Barnett’s notion of 
legitimacy escapes the notion of consent and popular sovereignty,56 holding 
that “[a] constitution is legitimate if it regulates the lawmaking powers it 
authorizes in such a manner as to provide an assurance that validly-made 
laws are necessary and will not violate rights.”57  
A different response to the question of constitutional legitimacy is 
somewhat specific to the government established by the American federal 
Constitution.  Under this view, the question of whether the public has a 
duty to obey the Constitution is a misleading one, because the Constitution 
hardly places any obligations on the American public.58  Rather, the 
Constitution is the law that governs those who govern59—the legislators, 
judges, and executors of the law, each of whom explicitly swear an oath to 
uphold the Constitution.  From this perspective, the question of 
constitutional legitimacy might be framed as whether the Constitution 
appropriately binds government actors, rather than the public—a 
 
 54 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) 
(“Moreover, assuming that the original position does determine a set of principles . . . it will then 
be true that whenever social institutions satisfy these principles those engaged in them can say to 
one another that they are cooperating on terms to which they would agree if they were free and 
equal persons whose relations with respect to one another were fair.”); LYSANDER SPOONER, The 
Unconstitutionality of Slavery, reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 1, 153 
(1971) (“Our constitutions purport to be established ‘by the people,’ and, in theory, ‘all the people’ 
consent to such government as the constitutions authorize.  But this consent of ‘the people’ exists 
only in theory.”); see also BARNETT, supra note 36, at 29–30 (discussing hypothetical consent).  
 55 JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
81–88 (2001). 
 56 See Barnett, supra note 32, at 637–38 (“[C]onsent does not of itself legitimate the terms of a 
constitution as it does (within limits) the terms of private contracts.  In this regard, then, I part 
company from the many originalists, both old and new, who base their originalism on notions of 
popular sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)).  
 57 Id. at 640.  See generally Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003).  
Although perfectly just laws are not possible, the governance system must include sufficient due 
process protections and substantive protections for rights to have legitimate claim over those who 
are bound by the system.  Barnett, supra note 32, at 640–41.  For Barnett, it does not really matter 
for legitimacy how a government was formed; it matters whether the government functions in a 
sufficiently procedurally and substantively just manner. 
 58 Currently, the Constitution forbids private persons from holding anyone in slavery or involuntary 
servitude, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, and from transporting or importing alcohol in violation 
of state or territorial law, U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.  However, given the fact that a 
constitutional violation of the Twenty-First Amendment can only occur coincident with a 
violation of another law, one might colorably characterize the only constitutional claim on private 
individuals as being contained in the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 59 See Barnett, supra note 32, at 633 (“The Constitution is a law that governs the lawmakers.”). 
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potentially easier question, given officials’ explicit oath. 
Concerns about the dead hand might further be conceptually separated 
into questions of whether “the Constitution” is legitimate and whether 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution is legitimate.  While Will 
Baude and Steven Sachs argue that these two questions are essentially the 
same,60 someone might also believe that the Constitution can legitimately 
bind government actors or citizens only so long as it can be “updated” and 
interpreted in a non-originalist way, or so long as precedent is followed 
regardless of whether or not the precedent is “originalist.”  
2.  Representational Legitimacy 
A variation of the legitimacy concern could be raised not because the 
Framers lived too far in the past, but because their demographic character 
was not representative of the population in the right way.  The 
overwhelming majority of women and black men could not vote for 
delegates in the ratifying conventions,61 nor could a large number of white 
men who did not own property and were living in states that conditioned 
voting on property ownership.  White women and people of color neither 
drafted the Constitution nor participated in the state ratifying conventions 
themselves.  Unsurprisingly, this history causes some individuals to resist 
embracing a system of government that systematically excluded people like 
themselves from its development.62 
Here again, this concern over legitimacy can be expressed in several 
ways.  One flavor of the concern might be better characterized as a concern 
about substantive outcomes rather than legitimacy.  Someone holding this 
variety of concern might ask, “If people like me were not represented when 
the government was formed, why should I believe this government will 
 
 60 See Baude, supra note 21, at 2391; Sachs, supra note 21, at 818–19. 
 61 Unique among states, New Jersey allowed unmarried women who owned sufficient property to 
vote in state elections between 1776 and 1807.  Jan Ellen Lewis, Rethinking Women’s Suffrage in New 
Jersey, 1776-1807, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1017, 1017 (2011); Judith Apter Klinghoffer & Lois Elkis, 
“The Petticoat Electors”: Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159, 159–
60 (1992).  At the time of ratification, free black men were eligible to vote under the same rules as 
white inhabitants of five states: New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, and 
Massachusetts.  MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22, at 107 n.6 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 572–73 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting)).  
 62 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks’ Fidelity to the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1761, 1761 (1997) (discussing whether black Americans have any duty to the Constitution); cf. 
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22, at 107 (“Given the slaves’ exclusion from the enactment 
process and their harsh treatment under laws not prohibited by the Constitution, our argument 
for the binding nature of the Constitution probably did not even apply to the slaves.”). 
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actually advance my interests?”  In other words, one may believe that, if 
people similar to oneself were not among the Framers, then surely the 
document produced would not yield substantively positive outcomes for the 
individual in question.63  Certainly, the original Constitution did not 
advance the interests of slaves in being free, but later amendments 
fundamentally altered the constitutional treatment of African-Americans.  
Whether the amended Constitution remains unjust is a more contestable 
and contested question.64  Nonetheless, if the Framers were indifferent or 
hostile to certain people’s interests, one could reasonably surmise, in the 
absence of further evidence, that those interests were likely not advanced by 
the Constitution.  But this supposition can also morph into a genetic fallacy, 
presuming that the Constitution must not favor a particular party’s interests 
because of its origins, regardless of what the available evidence indicates.  
Moreover, given the vast cultural differences between the founding era and 
the present-day, broader demographic representation at the founding 
might not have advanced the actual preferences of people today.  For 
example, historian Nancy F. Cott writes that women in the founding era 
often embraced their prescribed role in the private sphere.65  While equal 
representation at the Constitutional Convention may well have advanced 
many of the interests Abigail Adams considered when she urged John to 
“remember the ladies,” founding-era women probably would not have 
represented the interests of twenty-first- or even twentieth-century women 
accustomed to active participation in public and commercial life.66   
 
 63 Cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22, at 16 (“The supermajoritarian process is supposed to 
help protect minorities, but it has difficulty doing so if those minorities cannot participate.”). 
 64 McGinnis and Rappaport, for example, agree that “the most serious of all criticisms of originalism” 
is “the exclusion of African Americans and women from much of the constitution-making process.”  
Id.  They ultimately conclude that “subsequent generations have now corrected the most obvious 
and worst consequences of the exclusion of African Americans and women. . . . in the form of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments.  In light of these corrections, . . . 
further [nonoriginalist] judicial correction has more costs than benefits.” Id. at 17. 
 65 See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 
1780–1835, at 199 (1977) (“[W]omen of the past centuries rarely perceived, as many modern 
feminists do, an anithesis between women’s obligations in the domestic realm and their general 
progress.”); cf. id. at 8 (noting that in the 1830s, “an emphatic sentence of domesticity was 
pronounced for women.  Both male and female authors . . . created a new popular literature, 
consisting of advice books, sermons, novels, essays, stories, and poems, advocating and reiterating 
women’s certain, limited role.  That was to be wives and mothers, to nurture and maintain their 
families, to provide religious example and inspiration, and to affect the world around by 
exercising a private moral influence.”). 
 66 Cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22, at 112 (citing JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING 
THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 958 (2006)) (“[I]t is extremely speculative to assess how the 
Constitution would have been further changed, if at all, by the earlier inclusion of women in its 
making.  For instance, it is sometimes argued that the inclusion of women would have prevented 
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Another flavor of the representational legitimacy concern is akin to a 
concern about procedural justice.  Speaking most specifically about present-
day legal disputes, Tom Tyler has argued, based on his own empirical 
research, that litigants often regard legal proceedings as more legitimate if 
they feel that their experience was fair and procedurally just, regardless of 
whether legal outcomes actually come out in their favor.67  Other scholars 
emphasize the importance of litigants’ being heard.68  It is possible, then, 
that regardless of the results that originalist interpretation yields, some 
individuals will experience the originalist method as procedurally unjust 
because a population they closely identify with was excluded from crucial 
decisions in the past.  
3.  Contamination 
The prior two subparts articulated concerns over the procedural origins 
of the Constitution—who made it law, and when.  Closely related to 
concerns over procedural legitimacy is a concern over the substantive, 
moral character of the original Constitution—a sense that the Constitution 
is so tainted by its initial sanctioning of slavery that it cannot justly serve as 
a legitimate basis for our government going forward.  Greene gets at this 
idea when he describes his alienation from the restoration narrative 
sometimes associated with originalism.  “For me, as an African-American, a 
narrative of restoration is deeply alienating; what America has been is 
hostile to my personhood and denies my membership in the political 
community.”69  Culp’s rejection of intent originalism was also influenced by 
slavery’s role in the Constitution’s formation.70  Although related to 
 
statutes against abortions, but the current views of women provide reason to doubt this 
conclusion: The proportion of women who oppose abortion today is close to the proportion of 
men.”).  For support of the assertion by McGinnis and Rappaport, see Public Opinion on Abortion, 
PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/ (last 
accessed July 7, 2017) (finding in 2017 that fifty-nine percent of women and fifty-four percent of 
men believe abortion should be legal in all or most cases, and that thirty-eight percent of women 
and forty-two percent of men believe abortion should be illegal in all or most cases). 
 67 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
 68 See Pam A. Mueller, Victimhood and Agency: How Taking Charge Takes Its Toll, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 691, 
697–700 (2017) (“Procedural justice scholars . . . find that victims are more satisfied with legal 
outcomes if they are able to have a voice in the process.” (citation omitted)); cf. Erin L. Sheley, 
Reverberations of the Victim’s “Voice”: Victim Impact Statements and the Cultural Project of Punishment, 87 
IND. L.J. 1247, 1248–49 (2012) (“I contend that the complexity of a victim narrative effectively 
conveys the social experience of harm, without which the criminal justice system loses its 
legitimacy as a penal authority.”). 
 69 Greene, supra note 1, at 521 (emphasis omitted). 
 70 Culp, supra note 2, at 68–69 (“[R]ace and slavery, although never explicitly mentioned, cemented 
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concerns about political legitimacy and the outcome of present-day legal 
disputes, the discomfort with the Constitution’s origins reflects a slightly 
different instinct—that the origin of the Constitution was so tainted by the 
evil of slavery, that it cannot be—or has not been—reclaimed, reframed, or 
amended in a way that eliminates the contamination.  Just as some symbols 
or phrases become forever associated with indefensible movements or 
moments in history, some experience the Constitution as irredeemable and 
interpret following its original meaning as a hostile act regardless of the 
substantive outcomes of its application or the changes wrought by later 
amendments.71  
In this light, rejecting the originalist’s Constitution evokes an aspect of 
Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory—the idea that moral intuitions 
actually encompass several different kinds of commitments, including 
fairness, harm avoidance, loyalty—and purity.  According to Haidt’s 
theory, humans have moral reactions to objects and actions they regard as 
sanctified or degraded.  We are capable of experiencing a psychological 
intuition that some things are too repugnant to be touched or engaged with, 
even if they are not causing any concrete harm.72  Haidt argues that the 
intuition that some objects or actions are sanctified or degraded is 
“important for binding groups together.”73  To the extent that the 
Constitution is associated with a narrative of oppression, Haidt’s work 
articulates how the resulting conception of originalism and the Constitution 
as degraded can follow. 
4.  Alienation 
This Part has tried to separate out potential reasons why women and 
people of color may shy away from identifying themselves as “originalists” 
or as embracing an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.  
The reality of why any individual person rejects originalism may of course 
be highly varied, reflecting any combination of the concerns above, as well 
 
the Great Compromise between the Southern slave-holding states and the Northern states 
together like a bloody glue. . . .  To rely on original intent is to hitch our interpersonal scheme to 
a vision that excluded blacks.”).  
 71 Additionally, one could make an argument that blended concerns about adverse outcomes and 
contamination, worrying that the Constitution’s immoral origins necessarily, entail intolerable 
legal outcomes today, which were unintentionally not corrected by the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
 72 JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS 
AND RELIGION 170–77 (2012).  
 73 Id. at 154. 
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as more general concerns, such as about the determinacy of textual 
meaning. But of the concerns above, there is a common thread among 
them—a simultaneous sense that the Constitution was not created for 
certain people at the time of its drafting, and that originalists are not 
especially concerned with those people now. 
A partial explanation for this phenomenon is that many individuals 
hold “bundled,” rather than isolated, viewpoints, sometimes because a set 
of views represents a consistent philosophy, but sometimes because of 
psychological and social commitments to groups like political parties that 
advance a particular agenda or “party line.”74  Originalism is closely 
associated with one’s being conservative, libertarian, or Republican.  One 
may be attracted to originalism if one has those political views, but 
originalism will be a harder sell if one identifies as, for instance, liberal, 
progressive, or Democrat—both for substantive reasons (e.g., one may not 
believe originalism yields progressive results) and for cultural reasons 
(unconsciously, one may anticipate friends and associates will engage in 
judgmental or socially-rejecting behavior if one articulates an unpopular 
position).  These bundled associations may be strong enough that, even if it 
turned out that originalist interpretation advanced progressive policy goals, 
it would take a long while for self-identified progressives to find originalism 
attractive.  
But attributing alienation purely to partisan allegiances misses 
something very real about the experiences of people whose affinity groups 
were largely excluded from America’s framing and are largely absent from 
the originalist community now.  The alienation exists both in the past and 
present—not only did the political system and power structure at the time 
of the framing largely exclude women and people of color, but many of 
originalism’s present-day advocates do not seem especially sympathetic to 
individuals who reject originalism because they feel alienated from the 
framing era. 
 
 
 
 74 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Objectivity: A Feminist Revisit, 66 ALA. L. REV. 375, 385–86 (2014) (“When 
our identity is defined through the groups with whom we identify, the commitment to that 
identity motivates us to accept the dogma of these groups.  This motivation transcends the 
rationality of that dogma.” (citing HAIDT, supra note 72, at 189–220)).  
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II.  TOWARD A MORE AUTHENTIC ORIGINALISM 
Having teased apart various concerns someone might have about 
originalism, it becomes possible to distinguish between concerns that 
originalists can do something about and concerns that originalists can 
merely argue about.  In the latter category, we would include the concern 
that originalist interpretation yields undesirable legal outcomes, and 
legitimacy concerns that the dead hand should not control current political 
activity or that government-founding activities must be diverse along 
particular axes to be legitimate.  In these cases, the relevant facts are set.  If 
someone does not like an originalist interpretation of a clause of the 
Constitution, an originalist might argue that the result is not actually bad, 
that we are obliged to respect the result even if we do not like it because of 
other normative commitments, or that we are, in general, better off if we 
follow originalist methods, even if a particular outcome is not pleasing.  But 
ultimately, if the interpretive effort was done correctly, there is nothing for 
an originalist to do to change the outcome, as the meaning of the term or 
phrase at issue was fixed at the founding.  Similarly, while one can argue 
that the dead hand or representation problems ought not delegitimize the 
Constitution, the relevant facts of how the Constitution came to be ratified 
are essentially unchangeable—it remains true who drafted and ratified the 
document, and when they did it.  Short of re-ratifying the document, the 
circumstances under which the Constitution came to be are fixed. 
But other concerns present opportunities for originalists to improve 
originalist practice.  Conscious and unconscious biases that bend 
originalism away from its most authentic conclusions can be countered.  
Historic sources representing more diverse figures may be located, 
analyzed, and incorporated into the corpus of sources used to interpret 
constitutional text.  Indeed, if originalism is to become its best possible self, 
it should recognize and work to alleviate the sense of alienation that many 
populations feel about our government’s founding document—not merely 
by trying to convince others of the virtues of originalism with words, but by 
trying to include others with action.  The reason to be inclusive of diverse 
populations is not merely performative.  Inclusion of diverse perspectives—
in both the past and the present—has the potential to improve the quality 
of constitutional analysis, particularly, and counter-intuitively, in the areas 
of constitutional inquiry that are meant to be descriptive, specifically the 
search for the communicative content of the constitutional text.  
The balance of this Article explores how originalism can address several 
of the concerns set forth above, in sections that address correcting for 
present-day bias, incorporating more diverse populations into the corpus of 
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evidence of founding-era meaning, and alleviating the sense of alienation 
and contamination that some populations may associate with the 
Constitution and with originalism.  These efforts are related: by 
incorporating more diverse perspectives into constitutional interpretation, 
and by honestly wanting to do so, originalists and originalist practice can 
demonstrate that diverse perspectives are important, and that diverse 
populations matter.75  Incorporating diverse perspectives and seeking the 
opinions of a variety of interpreters will also serve to improve the originalist 
project, by making it easier to identify and correct for mistaken 
interpretations of historic texts.  
A.  Incorporating Diverse Perspectives 
1.  Embracing Self-Skepticism 
Originalist interpretation tends to be done by self-identified 
originalists—a group that tends to be highly educated, affluent, white, male, 
and tends to hold conservative, libertarian, or Republican views.  Some 
variation does exist.  Among judges, for example, Justice Thomas and 
former D.C. Circuit Court Judge Janice Rogers Brown are African-
American, originalist jurists, and along with Brown, Seventh Circuit Judge 
Diane Sykes is a female judge well-known for following an originalist 
methodology.76  A handful of progressives also call themselves originalist.77  
But on balance, the overwhelming majority of self-described originalists are 
white men who hold conservative, libertarian, or Republican views. 
If humans were easily able to set aside their existing beliefs and 
preferences about the world when addressing descriptive questions—such 
as how the founding-era public understood a particular word or phrase—it 
 
 75 Here, it is important to be precise about what I mean by “diverse perspectives.”  I do not mean 
that, if a population believes that an issue is important, or an interpretation is beneficial, that the 
assessment of the constitutional text’s meaning ought to resolve differently; indeed, this would 
deny the central “fixation thesis” of originalism—that we should understand the semantic 
meaning of the Constitution’s text as fixed at the time it was enacted.  See Solum, supra note 6, at 1 
(“The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when each provision is framed and ratified: this 
claim can be called the Fixation Thesis.  This thesis is one of two core ideas of originalist 
constitutional theory . . . .”).  Rather, diverse perspectives will help interpreters better understand 
the communicative content of the Constitution’s text, by being able to approach the text from a 
variety of directions. 
 76 Michele Gorman, A Look at Diane Sykes, Possible Trump SCOTUS Nominee, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 13, 
2016, 5:50 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/profile-diane-sykes-trumps-possible-scotus-
nominee-531588 (quoting Sykes as describing herself as an “originalist-textualist”). 
 77 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.  
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would not matter whether constitutional interpreters tended to have one 
background or another.  However, behavioral science research increasingly 
indicates that humans struggle to approach and resolve descriptive 
questions completely objectively.  In an essay on objectivity, Katharine 
Bartlett explains, “people’s brains function in ways that cause them often to 
process information in irrational, non-truth-seeking ways.”78  She canvases 
behavioral research that concludes, 
[W]e observe, remember, and assess new information to confirm our 
stereotypes, rather than to correct them.  Typically, when we confront 
evidence that conflicts with a stereotype we hold, we do not tend to revise 
our beliefs about the group; instead we dismiss the conflicting evidence as 
evidence of an exceptional case.79 
Perhaps more painfully, humans tend to “make up [their] minds first and 
then select the reasons that best support [their] chosen result.”80  In short, 
all sorts of factors get in the way of individuals looking at evidence and 
coming to the best or most-objective conclusions about that evidence.  
Distortions are created not simply by an individual’s narrow self-interest, 
but also by “the ways our brains work to over-generalize, self-justify, 
prioritize present over future gain, affirm rather than test what we already 
believe, and form beliefs according to the groups with whom we identify.”81 
Some see evidence that everyone’s perspective is somewhat biased and 
conclude that objectivity is impossible or non-existent.82  But the existence 
of cognitive biases does not mean that there is no truth about how the 
Constitution was understood at the framing, or that such truth is 
inaccessible.  Rather, the existence of pervasive cognitive biases means that 
efforts to uncover the original meaning of the Constitution must grapple 
not only with the challenge of locating appropriate evidence, but also with 
the challenges of accessing truth even when all the relevant facts are right in 
front of us—the challenges of transcending “not only our self-interests, but 
also the mental processes that motivate us to fulfill our various 
 
 78 Bartlett, supra note 74, at 384. 
 79 Id. at 384–85 (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 22–24 (1954)); Steven 
L. Neuburg, Expectency-Confirmation Processes in Stereotype-Tinged Social Encounters: The Moderating Role of 
Social Goals, in 7 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 103, 106, 108 
(Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good 
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1893, 1910–11 (2009)). 
 80 Bartlett, supra note 74, at 385 (citing Jonathan Haidt, Moral Psychology and the Law: How Intuitions 
Drive Reasoning, Judgment, and the Search for Evidence, 64 ALA. L. REV. 867 (2013)); see also HAIDT, 
supra note 72, at 27–51. 
 81 Bartlett, supra note 74, at 387. 
 82 See generally MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992).  
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psychological and emotional needs rather than to discover truth.”83 
Bartlett’s theory of “positionality” is a helpful guidepost for approaching 
this challenge.  Rather than deny the existence of truth or of humans’ 
ability to access it, Bartlett argues that we must combine “self-skepticism 
with a commitment to truth-seeking, encompassing a responsibility both for 
understanding our own partiality and distorted ways of thinking and for 
striving to overcome these multiple distortions.”84  She warns against both 
being over-confident in one’s objectivity and about willingly abandoning 
the search for objectivity in order to advance one’s own interests: 
Overconfidence in our objectivity and excessive cynicism about it are both 
truth-suppressing, although for different reasons.  When we are too sure 
about our objectivity, we take things conveniently for granted, neglecting 
the obligation to identify and defend our assumptions and our criteria for 
truth and to recognize alternative perspectives.  When we are too cynical, 
we also neglect the obligation to look beyond our own perspectives; since 
we don’t think objectivity exists, or we believe it exists only to maintain 
existing power relationships, there seems little reason to search for it.  
Positionality . . . recogniz[es] the limitations of our own objectivities, yet 
accept[s] the obligation to justify ourselves in terms intelligible from outside 
our limitations.  
  . . . . 
Some propositions—about law, or moral truth, or the workings of the 
physical universe—are simply more true, or more right, than others.85  
Although objectivity and accessing descriptive truths are possible, 
overconfidence in our objectivity can result in descriptive truths eluding us.  
Originalists in search of accurate accounts of what the text of the 
Constitution meant at the time its provisions were enacted thus have an 
obligation not only to seek truth as best they can, but to also be vigilant 
about the areas where truth-seeking endeavors might be unwillingly 
distorted.  Given the homogeneity of originalist interpreters, one starting 
point for trying to defend against the possibility of distortion is to seek 
consensus among other interpreters with different backgrounds who are 
asking the same questions.  
A diverse population of originalist constitutional interpreters may reveal 
unanimity on some questions—evidence that would suggest the unanimous 
view is accurate—and, in other cases, result in disagreement on how a term 
or clause was understood or would apply at the time of its adoption.86  This 
 
 83 Bartlett, supra note 74, at 389. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 393–94 (footnotes omitted). 
 86 Indeed, some disagreement should be expected; the public meaning of the Constitution at the 
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disagreement can be a feature and not a bug, revealing how various 
interpreters’ experiences and psychological commitments may be affecting 
their conclusions.  As Jack Balkin observes, 
The choice of which facts are relevant and important, and how and why 
they are relevant and important, are shaped by our theoretical and 
practical commitments.  Those commitments prefigure what we look for in 
the past, how we evaluate what we find, what we discard as peripheral or 
not germane, and what we will do with the evidence that we bring forward 
with us into the present.87  
Although we may work to be aware of the default beliefs we hold about 
the world, it is only possible to consciously recognize and question so many 
of them at any one time.  Despite our best efforts to objectively understand 
the external environment, or the experiences of others, we are not always 
able to recognize when our pre-existing perspectives distort our 
investigations. 
Because of this, we can take advantage of other individuals’ diverse 
perspectives to compare and triangulate meaning, in order to better 
understand the objects of our inquiry.88  By comparing and contrasting a 
variety of interpretations, we can check each other’s distorting 
preconceptions.89  In this way, originalism stands to benefit a great deal 
from diversifying its participants—the more those attempting to understand 
the founding-era meaning of the Constitution differ today, the more likely 
we will be able to accurately understand the founding-era public. 
 
framing, and our understanding of that public meaning today, is not one single meaning, but 
many individuals’ and groups’ largely-overlapping, but non-identical, meanings.  See Gary 
Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 56 (2006) 
(“Assuming that reader and author are both speaking the same language, that both are relatively 
fluent in that language, and that the phrase is part of the standard vocabulary of ordinary 
speakers, there is reason to think that there will be substantial overlap in the coverage that each 
will give to the phrase, but there is room for divergence at the margins.”). 
 87 Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 82 (2016). 
 88 See Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind & Brian Quinn, Founding-Era Translations of the 
U.S. Constitution, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 16 (2016) (arguing that the existence of multiple 
translations of the Constitution creates the ability to “triangulate” common elements to clarify 
original meaning); cf. Lawrence M. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the European 
Court of Justice, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 293 (2009) (“The ability to compare different versions 
and then to triangulate . . . brings out nuances that can help the investigator gain additional 
insight into the thoughts of the original drafter.”).  
 89 One can imagine a twofold criticism of this claim.  First, that more powerful or confident 
individuals are still likely to have their biases creep into interpretation, despite the presence of 
countervailing viewpoints.  Second, that even despite best efforts, it would not be possible to fully 
eliminate how our experiences and worldview might distort our understanding of how members 
of the founding public understood the Constitution.  Yet, even though we cannot achieve 
perfection, improvement is still a worthwhile goal.  
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2.  Being Wary of “Reasonableness” 
One particular aspect of originalist interpretation that risks distortion 
through unconscious bias is the search for the original, semantic content of 
the constitutional text.  Members of the founding-era public did not all 
share a completely uniform understanding of the Constitution’s text.  
Accordingly, originalists are faced with the questions of how to translate the 
range of multiple, actually-held meanings into a conception of “what the 
Constitution means” and how to apply that meaning to resolve legal 
questions.  This interpretive exercise has the potential to distort founding-
era meaning, if decision-makers end up choosing “the” meaning based on 
normative judgments, while styling their choice as an objective or positive 
analysis of what the text objectively meant.  
For example, one popular approach is to characterize the public 
meaning of the Constitution as what a reasonable person would have 
understood the text to mean.  Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman advance the 
claim that the Constitution itself instructs interpreters to understand it as 
written by and for “We the People of the United States.”90  Because “We 
the People” is a hypothetical construction, Lawson and Seidman try to 
understand who this anthropomorphized “We the People” is based on the 
content of the Constitution and the circumstances under which the 
Constitution was written.  They write, 
[T]he hypothetical “We the People of the United States” is a pretty good 
fit with the reasonable person of the law.  This person is highly intelligent 
and educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle connections 
and inferences.  This person is committed to the enterprise of reason, 
which can provide a common framework for discussion and 
argumentation.  This person is familiar with the peculiar language and 
conceptual structure of the law.  “We the People of the United States” is a 
formidable intellectual figure.91 
For Lawson and Seidman, information about what actual people 
believed about the Constitution is merely relevant, but not dispositive: “In 
order to know what mental states can most appropriately be attributed to 
the reasonable person, it helps to know the mental states that were most 
likely held by real persons situated in the same point in space and time.”92 
Lawson and Seidman’s “reasonable member of the founding public” will 
often be quite different from various actual members of the founding public 
who were less educated, less committed to particular approaches to 
 
 90 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 86, at 70.  
 91 Id. at 73. 
 92 Id. at 80. 
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argument, and less knowledgeable about the law.  
Other authors suggest a “reasonable person” standard for 
understanding the Constitution that looks a bit more like a colloquial 
conception of reasonableness, rather than Lawson and Seidman’s 
superman.  For example, Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen 
argue, as characterized by Paulsen, “It is the objective meaning of the 
words—the meaning the words would have, in context, to some 
hypothetical ‘objective observer’ or ‘reasonable person’—that matters.”93  
Randy Barnett similarly explains,  
[T]he New Originalism seeks to identify what a reasonable speaker of 
English would have understood the words of the text to mean at the time of 
its enactment.  This is as much an empirical inquiry as it would be to 
ascertain what the words I am now using mean today.94  
At least one way of understanding “reasonable meanings” can remain 
highly descriptive—if by “reasonable meanings” we simply mean shared 
meanings.  On this broad view, we can exclude idiosyncratic and singular 
interpretations of the Constitution from the set of “reasonable 
interpretations.”95  For example, an unreasonable interpretation of “the 
power to establish post offices and post roads” would be that the power 
includes the authority to commission sculptures of the Greek Pantheon for 
public parks.  Even if I were a member of the founding public and 
genuinely believed this to be the case, it would not be a reasonable 
interpretation of the text simply because no one else would think I thought 
commissioning sculptures was important if I said, “I think it is important 
that government can establish post offices.”  What makes an interpretation 
reasonable in this broadest sense is merely that it would be likely for some 
population of people (but not necessarily all people) to arrive at that 
interpretation if a speaker used the words in question. 
 
 93 Paulsen, supra note 9, at 874 (describing his and Vasan Kesavan’s view and citing Vasan Kesavan 
& Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 
1113, 1131–32 (2003)); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the 
Text, So Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1440 (2014) 
(“[T]he true, original public meaning of the language employed . . . is[ ] the objective meaning 
the words would have had, in historical, linguistic, and political context, to a reasonable, informed 
speaker and reader of the English language at the time they were adopted.”). 
 94 Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 415 (2013) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 (2001) (“‘[O]riginal meaning’ refers to the meaning a reasonable 
speaker of English would have attached to the words, phrases, sentences, etc. at the time the 
particular provision was adopted.”).  
 95 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 93, at 1130 (“The meaning of the words and phrases of the 
Constitution as law is necessarily fixed as against private assignments of meaning.”).  
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On this view of reasonableness, there can be multiple reasonable 
interpretations of language, in the context of how it was expressed, so long 
as there exist multiple populations of people who would share each 
interpretation among themselves.  One useful example of the existence of 
multiple meanings is reflected in an early discussion over the scope of the 
meaning of the Progress Clause.96  In the debates surrounding the need for 
the First Amendment, specifically the freedom of the press, Federalists and 
Antifederalists expressed a different opinion about the powers granted to 
Congress in the Progress Clause.  Antifederalist Robert Whitehall was 
concerned that the power to secure “to authors the right [to] their writings” 
would give Congress the power to license printing presses, thus 
necessitating the need for the First Amendment.97  In contrast, Federalist 
James Iredell argued that the Progress Clause only gave Congress the 
power to grant rights to particular works to their authors98—to create what 
we now call copyrights.  Given the passage of the First Amendment, and 
the fact that Congress has never tried to require licensure to run a printing 
press, we do not know how this clause would have been interpreted in the 
absence of the passage of the First Amendment.  But it seems clear that 
each party believed the “exclusive right to one’s writings” described in the 
Progress Clause had different scopes. 
If reasonable meanings are merely shared meanings, we might think that 
either believing the Progress Clause only authorized the creation of copyrights 
or believing that the Progress Clause authorized licensure of the press was 
reasonable, because both meanings were held by particular populations.  
This conception of “reasonable meanings as shared meanings” has the 
potential to be fairly objective; we identify reasonable interpretations by 
trying to ascertain interpretations that would have been shared or 
understood by a significant number of people in the founding period.  
 
 
 96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 97 The Pennsylvania Convention: Saturday, 1 December 1787, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 444, 454 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009); 
see also id. (“Congress [will] have a power to destroy liberty of the press . . . .  They have a power 
to secure to authors the right of their writings.  Under this, they may license the press, . . . and 
under licensing the press, they may suppress it.”). 
 98 See James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 
1787–1788, at 360–61 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) (1788) (“Congress will have no other 
authority over [liberty of the press] than to secure to authors for a limited time an exclusive 
privilege of publishing their works.”). 
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But this framing of “reasonable” may seem to eliminate something 
important about the notion of reasonableness; we do not tend to use the 
word “reasonable” to mean “actual.”99  You may look at the Progress 
Clause debate, read the text carefully, and decide, “This text only gives 
Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to an author’s writings.  How 
could one read a power to license printers into that?”  You might conclude 
that even if the Antifederalist interpretation of the clause was widespread, it 
was an unreasonable interpretation because the meaning was not supported 
by the text.  This intuition leads towards a concept of reasonableness closer 
to what Lawson and Seidman articulate—reasonable meanings are not just 
actual meanings, but also take into account values such as logic, certain 
modes of textual analysis, and the like.  The meanings that Lawson and 
Seidman would consider reasonable might seem both better justified and 
less numerous—creating more constraint on how judges apply the text. 
But for all the apparent benefits of a robust “reasonable person” 
standard for original meaning, searching for this kind of “reasonableness” 
creates a tension with the goal of undertaking an “empirical inquiry”100 into 
what the words meant.  Once we start jettisoning some actually-held and 
publicly-understood meanings, we are engaged in a normative enterprise—
determining which actually-held meanings are better, more justified, more 
logical, more consistent.101  These are worthwhile endeavors, but they are 
not addressing empirical questions.  When we seek that kind of reasonable 
meaning, we are no longer asking a descriptive question about what the 
text meant to the public.  But if we mistakenly believe we are engaged in an 
empirical inquiry, we open the door for our pre-existing and present-day 
values and commitments to influence our judgment, without being 
consciously aware that it is happening.102  And to the extent that many 
individuals engaged in originalist interpretation are similarly situated, the 
process of searching for the reasonable founding-era person’s 
 
 99 Cf. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 326 (2012) 
(arguing that reasonableness must be a normative, not a positive, notion).  
 100 Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, supra note 94, at 415 (emphasis added) (describing the 
process of discerning the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text as an empirical inquiry). 
 101 Balkin worries that if originalists search for single meanings, “we will discover that we will only be 
able to draw out a single answer from the past by reading the evidence selectively and 
opportunistically, by ignoring many participants in the ratification process, or by declaring that 
their views were not in fact reasonable.”  Balkin, supra note 87, at 92; see also id. (“But in any age or 
era—as in our own—reasonable people often differ about many things, especially where politics is 
involved.”). 
 102 Cf. Cornell, supra note 8, at 301 (criticizing when New Originalists “side step dealing with the 
actual beliefs of Americans and substitute the beliefs of a fictive reader, effectively turning 
constitutional interpretation into an act of historical ventriloquism”). 
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interpretations invites a particular projection of a present-day, white, male, 
educated, conservative or libertarian person’s experiences onto eighteenth-
century members of the founding public.  
It may be difficult to imagine how a search for “reasonableness” may 
result in projecting present-day values into the past, but we can identify 
some examples where present-day commitments might cause an interpreter 
to unwillingly misunderstand the Constitution’s meaning to the founding 
public.  Saul Cornell, for example, has argued that many founding-era 
elites adhered to Blackstone’s view that preambulatory text played a 
significant role in establishing how legal language should be interpreted.103  
In the present day, this is far less true.  Both District of Columbia v. Heller104 
and Eldred v. Ashcroft105 avoided reading a constitutional clause’s preambles 
to limit the scope of a constitutional right or power.  Popular scholarship 
also argues that preambles do not limit the scope of subsequent clauses.106  
But let us assume that Cornell is not only correct, but that, counterfactually, 
acceptance of Blackstone’s approach to preambles was even more 
widespread than even Cornell argues.107  A present-day interpreter, even 
knowing about Blackstone’s influence on the founding-era public, might 
unconsciously discount evidence of meaning derived from reference to the 
preamble, having internalized the idea that it is more reasonable to 
discount the potential effect of preamble texts.  
Feminist legal scholarship in the 1990s and early 2000s also explored 
the challenges of searching for an objective “reasonableness” in the context 
 
 103 See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 631–35, 633 n.37 (2008) (criticizing Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v. 
Heller because he ignores Blackstone’s rules on interpretation which “mandate[ ] a consideration 
of the preamble” when the language of an enactment is ambiguous). 
 104 554 U.S. 570, 578, 599 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause 
“announces the purpose for which the right was codified,” but that the clause neither “suggest[s] 
that preserving the militia” was the only reason for its enactment nor limits the Amendment’s 
operative language). 
 105 537 U.S. 186, 213–14 (2003) (finding that the perambulatory goal of promoting science did not 
constrain Congress from extending copyrights where Congress had consistently adopted “new 
definitions or adjustments of the copyright term”). 
 106 Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 807 (1998) (“To the 
extent the operative clause is ambiguous, the justification clause may inform our interpretation of 
it, but the justification clause can’t take away what the operative clause provides.  And because we 
know that operative clauses may be at times broader and at times narrower than justification 
clauses, we should accept that the two clauses will sometimes point in different directions.”). 
 107 Cornell, in fact, argues that there were divergent views about whether to adopt Blackstone’s 
method of legal interpretation, with more elite lawyers embracing Blackstone, and more populist 
figures arguing that text should be understood according to its plain meaning.  See Cornell, supra 
note 8, at 311–12, 314–17, 319–20. 
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of sexual harassment and domestic violence.108  Concerned that notions of 
the “reasonable man” and “reasonable person” were effectively 
androcentric,109 some circuit courts went so far as to specifically ask how a 
“reasonable woman” would have responded to harassment, believing that 
based on dissimilar nature or experiences, a reasonable man and a 
reasonable woman might respond to harassment in different ways.110  
Distinguishing among reasonable men, reasonable women, and reasonable 
people presented its own problems, as some commentators observed that 
the construct of the “reasonable woman” appeared to instantiate a variety 
of controversial stereotypes about women—that women were, for example, 
 
 108 See, e.g., MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 276–81 (2003) (“[A]dopting the reasonable 
person standard, given its history as the reasonable man, seemed to privilege one understanding 
of social interaction in the workplace (that of men) and simultaneously undermine the alternative 
understanding of such interaction (that of women) . . . . ”); Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable 
Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, DISSENT, Winter 1995, at 48–49; Anita 
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 468–69 (1997) (arguing 
that removing group identity from a reasonableness standard undercuts sexual harassment claims 
by ignoring the social, historical, and conduct-specific contexts in which such claims arise); Naomi 
R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1400 (1992) (arguing that the law requires a reasonable woman standard 
for cases of sexual harassment and domestic assault because the law fails to address or incorporate 
the experiences of female victims in gender-specific acts); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and 
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990) 
(critically examining the reasonable woman standard as insufficiently capturing the context in 
which an individual acts, and therefore “any unequal social conditions that affect an individual’s 
situation are both perpetuated . . . by such . . . [broad] standard[s]”); Stephanie M. Wildman, 
Ending Male Privilege: Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1797, 1806 (2000) (arguing for 
a gendered reasonableness standard that incorporates systemic privilege in legal analyses). 
 109 See Cahn, supra note 108, at 1405 (“[A] reasonable person may resemble a reasonable man . . . .  
Feminist theory has re-examined the reasonableness standard as part of a critique of ‘objective’ 
standards.  So-called neutral and objective standards may contain unstated assumptions that are 
actually gendered.” (citations omitted)).  For a more general discussion of androcentric standards 
in the law, see SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE 
ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY 39–79, 183–91 (1993). 
 110 See, e.g., Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 136–37 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying the objection 
to the use of a reasonable woman standard in jury instructions because, given the evidence and 
arguments presented at trial, the jury did not misunderstand the legal standard); Hurley v. Atl. 
City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 115–17 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding the lower court properly applied 
the reasonable woman standard for a sexual harassment claim); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 
632 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the reasonableness standard, as applied to female employees, 
requires considering the conditions under which a reasonable woman would find the work 
environment hostile); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that victims 
experience sexual harassment or violence differently among genders, and thus adopting a 
reasonable woman standard because the “sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-
biased and tends to systemically ignore the experiences of women”); see also Ann C. McGinley, 
Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012) (summarizing the adoption and use of the 
reasonable woman standard by courts and the critique of that standard by scholars). 
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more moral, more sensitive, and less sex-seeking than men.111  Theirs and 
others’ extensive meditation on what constituted “reasonableness” assessed 
that the “reasonable person” could only be so much of a blank slate.112  But 
choosing what qualities were included in the “reasonable” person was a 
normative enterprise, not a positive one,113 and individuals and populations 
would sometimes differ on what “reasonable” means, based on their own 
experiences and commitments.114 
Critiquing the search for a “reasonable member of the founding public” 
does not deny that there are better and worse interpretations of the 
Constitution.  Rather, the aim is to highlight that, to the extent we want to 
separate empirical or descriptive accounts of what the text meant at the 
framing (its semantic content), and normative accounts of how the text 
should be understood and applied (its legal content), the question of what is 
a reasonable interpretation belongs in the latter category.  There, we can 
make normative claims about the application of the constitutional text and, 
knowing that we are doing so, be more explicit about what we are claiming 
and why, and take measures to avoid distorted reasoning.  
B.  Identifying Diverse Historic Speakers 
The previous Section explored how the original meaning of the 
Constitution might be unwillingly distorted across time, if present-day 
 
 111 See Cahn, supra note 108, at 1415–17 (criticizing the reasonable woman standard because it 
incorporates sexist stereotypes about women, does not distinguish between women of different 
backgrounds, and focuses too closely on the behavior of the victim rather than the perpetrator). 
 112 See Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the 
Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 289–91 (2002) (analyzing “subjective” and “objective” 
standards for self-defense and arguing that both require consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding the actus reus); Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances, 50 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 661–62 (2013) (arguing that it is impossible to determine the relevant 
characteristics of a defendant for a reasonableness inquiry where subjective and objective 
standards necessitate consideration of the circumstances of the individual’s conduct).  
 113 See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary 
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 788 (1994) (arguing the reasonable person test includes 
normative aspects); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 137, 138 (2008) (referring to the reasonable person test as normative).  Mayo Moran 
critiques the application of the “reasonable person” as, in practice, a “standard of ordinariness,” 
although the comment seems to assume that reasonableness is actually a normative concept.  See 
MORAN, supra note 108, at 13.  
 114 See Balkin, supra note 87, at 82 (“The choice of which facts are relevant and important, and how 
and why they are relevant and important, are shaped by our theoretical and practical 
commitments.  Those commitments prefigure what we look for in the past, how we evaluate what 
we find, what we discard as peripheral or not germane, and what we will do with the evidence 
that we bring forward with us into the present.”). 
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interpreters unintentionally project their existing views about language and 
politics onto speakers from the past.  But distorted interpretations can also 
occur if a present-day interpreter primarily looks at how the Constitution 
was understood by a subset of the public and mistakenly concludes that the 
views of the subset accurately represent the views of the majority or even 
the whole. 
For example, Saul Cornell has argued that elite and non-elite members 
of the founding public adhered to varying methods of interpreting the 
Constitution.115  It is similarly plausible that particular words or phrases in 
the original Constitution or its amendments would have been understood 
slightly differently across geographic location, across social and economic 
class, across language, across gender, and across race and ethnic 
background.  If public-meaning originalists seek to understand the 
Constitution as it was understood by the public, the meanings of the entire 
public must be considered.  Ignoring the understanding of lower-class 
Americans, black Americans, German-speakers, or women ex ante presumes 
that the views of elite, white, English-speaking men were either identical to 
other groups’ interpretations, or were the best or most reasonable 
interpretations of the Constitution.  But we can’t make normative 
judgments about the reasonableness or quality of these populations’ 
understanding of the Constitution until we know what their “actual public 
meanings” were. 
1.  Working with Incomplete Records 
The realities of historical inquiry get in the way of discovering the views 
of linguistic and cultural sub-communities.  Interpretations and 
commentary on the Constitution are more likely to have been preserved if 
there were many copies printed or if the works were written by well-known 
individuals or were thought to have been important.  By definition, illiterate 
individuals left almost no written record of their thoughts and beliefs, unless 
they had been transcribed by another.116  These realities mean that our 
 
 115 See Cornell, supra note 8, at 309–10 (“At one extreme stood men . . . who were firmly committed 
to the methods of the lawyer’s constitution.  In the middle stood many self-made lawyers who had 
some familiarity with Blackstone’s writings.  Further along this continuum were moderates who 
believed that the law required no special knowledge, and at the extreme were plebeian populists 
who believed the voice of the people could be spontaneously gathered by juries or even mobs.”). 
 116 See CATHERINE ADAMS & ELIZABETH H. PLECK, LOVE OF FREEDOM: BLACK WOMEN IN 
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND 21 (2010) (noting that, when one person’s 
story is told to another who writes it down, “[i]t is impossible to distinguish between the two 
voices in such collaborative efforts or discern the process that went into constructing a single 
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corpus of direct commentary about the Constitution, and of texts 
illustrating how language was used in general, will over-represent the elite 
and influential population that played a significant role in the public sphere. 
Nonetheless, even though much information is irretrievably 
inaccessible, originalists can still work with available tools and material to 
ensure that when we talk about public meaning, we are considering as 
much of the entire public as possible.  Brigham Young University’s recent 
efforts to create a large corpus of American English from the founding era 
and later historical periods117 lays a helpful groundwork for investigating 
and incorporating America’s distinct populations into originalist 
constitutional analysis, even where there is little direct evidence about what 
members of those populations thought about the constitutional text itself.  
Designers of corpora of historic American English could consciously work 
to include and tag the writings of people of color, women, and other 
minorities and distinctive cultural sub-communities, so that investigators 
could research not only how language was used by the entire public, but 
also how language was used by these particular populations.  In this way, it 
might be possible to identify divergent understandings of constitutional 
language across populations by looking at how key terms and phrases were 
used in other written contexts. 
Complicating any attempt to identify and include diverse populations in 
historic corpora is the reality that it is often difficult to determine an 
author’s demographic characteristics by name (or pseudonym) alone, 
without doing additional biographical research or deducing information 
from the content of the text.  Especially over many texts, it may be 
impracticable to identify relevant characteristics of historic authors.  One 
mitigating resource may be minority-owned and oriented newspapers, the 
first of which appeared in the 1820s.118  In the case of newspapers whose 
intended audience was black, Hispanic, or Native American, one can more 
easily surmise that the authors of those papers often represented their 
intended audience.  Although the 1820s and 1830s postdate ratification by 
several decades, language from that time may still be probative of how 
 
account”). 
 117 See BYU LAW—LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, http://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
 118 See JUAN GONZÁLEZ & JOSEPH TORRES, NEWS FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: THE EPIC STORY OF 
RACE AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA 64–65 (2012) (providing a short history of the pre-Civil War 
founding of newspapers by people of color); see, e.g., THE LIBERATOR, http://fair-use.org/the-
liberator/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (archiving The Liberator newspaper, a “radical 
Abolitionis[t]” publication, 1831–1865). 
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language was used and understood at the framing and during the drafting 
and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
Additionally, we are also already aware of many individual white 
women and people of color who authored significant writings, even if they 
did not always—or ever—discuss constitutional and legal ideas.  These 
speakers admittedly remain unrepresentative of the average member of the 
public—their writings survive because these authors were prominent and 
often uncommonly educated for their time.  Nonetheless, works by these 
authors constitute examples of how language was used by sub-populations 
and counterpublics119 in the founding era and during the ratification of 
later amendments.120  In the founding era particularly, female and black 
authors were rare, and so the next few paragraphs will highlight several of 
the most prominent authors in that time.121 
 
 119 The idea of “counterpublics” emerges from responses to Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public 
sphere.  Habermas described the public sphere as where “something approaching public opinion 
can be formed.”  Jürgen Habermas, The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article, in CRITICAL THEORY 
AND SOCIETY: A READER 136, 136 (Stephen Eric Bronner & Douglas MacKay Kellner eds., 
1989).  He “focused on the ways in which bourgeois society developed modes of interaction, from 
the small-group interactions of salons and coffee houses to the later, larger institutional arenas 
such as the press.”  James W. Fox Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. 
L. REV. 675, 716 (2016) (footnote omitted).  Critics of Habermas pointed out that notions of “the 
public sphere” also needed to take into account discourse within “excluded and subordinated 
communities.”  See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992); see also 
Fox, supra, at 716.  The notion of “counterpublics” emerged as “sites where excluded or 
subordinated groups can develop and refine counter-discourses, both to maintain and develop 
their own meanings and identities and to re-engage the dominant ‘public’ sphere in a critical 
discourse.”  Fox, supra, at 716. 
 120 For a discussion of the development of a black counterpublic sphere in late-eighteenth-century 
America, see Joanna Brooks, The Early American Public Sphere and the Emergence of a Black Print 
Counterpublic, 62 WM. & MARY Q. 67 (2005). 
 121 By contrast, female and minority commentary on the later amendments was more common.  See 
e.g., AFRO-AMERICAN WOMEN WRITERS 1746–1933 (Ann Allen Shockley ed., 1988); 1 HISTORY 
OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Arno Press, Inc. 1969) (1881) 
(including documents dated from 1848 to 1861); 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton et al. eds., Arno Press, Inc. 1969) (1882) (including documents dated from 1861 to 
1876); 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1886) (including 
documents dated from 1876 to 1885); 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Susan B. Anthony & 
Ida Husted Harper eds., 1902) (including documents dated from 1883 to 1900); 5 HISTORY OF 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Ida Husted Harper ed., 1922) (including documents from 1900 to 1920); 6 
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Ida Husted Harper ed., 1922) (including more documents 
from 1900 to 1920); 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840–1865 (Philip 
S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979); 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE 
CONVENTIONS, 1840–1865 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1980); THE BLACK 
AMERICANS: A HISTORY IN THEIR OWN WORDS 1619–1983 (Milton Meltzer ed., 1984); THE 
CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE: SELECTIONS FROM THE CLASSIC WORK OF 
STANTON, ANTHONY, GAGE, AND HARPER (Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 1978) (selections 
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Among the black, male founding-era figures in America who produced 
significant writings were African Methodist Episcopal Church founder 
Richard Allen;122 almanac author, mathematician, and surveyor Benjamin 
Banneker;123 businessman and sea captain Paul Cuffe;124 businessman and 
sailmaker James Forten;125 founder of black freemasonry Prince Hall;126 
Calvinist minister and Federalist Lemuel Haynes;127 poet Jupiter 
Hammon;128 preacher John Jea;129 founder of the Protestant-Episcopal 
 
from the six volumes of History of Woman Suffrage, including documents reacting to the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments’ introduction of gender into the Constitution); Fox, supra note 119 
(exploring black discourse surrounding the Reconstruction Amendments); About the Colored 
Conventions, COLORED CONVENTIONS PROJECT, http://coloredconventions.org/ (hosting 
primary source documents from “colored conventions” from 1830–1899) (last visited Nov. 12, 
2018). 
 122 Allen was a major figure in Philadelphia’s black community in the late eighteenth century.  See 
generally GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FORMATION OF PHILADELPHIA’S BLACK 
COMMUNITY, 1720–1840 (1988); RICHARD S. NEWMAN, FREEDOM’S PROPHET: BISHOP 
RICHARD ALLEN, THE AME CHURCH, AND THE BLACK FOUNDING FATHERS (2008). 
 123 See generally BENJAMIN BANNEKER, BANNEKER’S ALMANAC AND EPHEMERIS (1975) (published 
annually from 1792 to 1797); SILVIO A. BEDINI, THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN BANNEKER (1972) 
(including documents written by Benjamin Banneker).  Banneker’s almanacs are described in 
BEDINI, supra, 137–201.  Banneker is also known for participating in the land survey of the 
District of Columbia and for corresponding with Thomas Jefferson on the injustice of slavery.  See 
BEDINI, supra, at 103; id. at 151–58 (reprinting Banneker’s letter, dated August 19, 1791, and 
Jefferson’s response, dated August 30, 1791).  
 124 More precisely, Cuffe was part black and part Native American.  Unlike several of his 
contemporaries, including Richard Allen and Absalom Jones, Cuffe supported efforts for black 
people in America to return to Africa.  NASH, supra note 122, at 184–85, 235–239.  Cuffe’s 
writings can be found in PAUL CUFFE, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF PAUL 
CUFFE, A PEQUOT INDIAN: DURING THIRTY YEARS SPENT AT SEA, AND IN TRAVELLING IN 
FOREIGN LANDS (1839).  See also CAPTAIN PAUL CUFFE’S LOGS AND LETTERS, 1808-1817: A 
BLACK QUAKER’S “VOICE FROM WITHIN THE VEIL” (Rosalind Cobb Wiggins ed., 1996); 
LAMONT D. THOMAS, PAUL CUFFE: BLACK ENTREPRENEUR AND PAN-AFRICANIST (1988). 
 125 See JAMES FORTEN, LETTERS FROM A MAN OF COLOUR, ON A LATE BILL BEFORE THE SENATE 
OF PENNSYLVANIA (1813); JULIE WINCH, A GENTLEMAN OF COLOR: THE LIFE OF JAMES 
FORTEN (2002); Julie Winch, The Making and Meaning of James Forten’s Letters from a Man of 
Colour, 64 WM. & MARY Q. 129 (2007). 
 126 See CHARLES H. WESLEY, PRINCE HALL: LIFE & LEGACY (1977) (including Hall’s letter book and 
his 1792 and 1797 charges to the African Lodge). 
 127 See LEMUEL HAYNES, BLACK PREACHER TO WHITE AMERICA: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF 
LEMUEL HAYNES, 1774–1833 (Richard Newman ed., 1990); JOHN SAILLANT, BLACK PURITAN, 
BLACK REPUBLICAN: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF LEMUEL HAYNES, 1753–1833 (2003); Ruth 
Bogin, Note, “Liberty Further Extended”: A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by Lemuel Haynes, 40 WM. & 
MARY Q. 85 (1983). 
 128 Hammon was a slave in New York who published numerous poems throughout his life and An 
Address to the Negroes in the State of New-York in 1787.  See JUPITER HAMMON, AN ADDRESS TO THE 
NEGROES IN THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (1787), available at 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/12/; JUPITER HAMMON, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JUPITER HAMMON (Cedrick May ed., 2017). 
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African church Absalom Jones;130 preacher John Marrant;131 and orator 
and tobacco seller Peter Williams Jr.132  
Poet Phillis Wheatley133 stands essentially alone as a founding-era black 
woman whose writing remains accessible.134  
While these individuals left numerous, sometimes highly-political, 
writings, few black Americans directly commented on the Constitution at 
the time of ratification in a way that has been preserved today.135  There 
 
 129 Jea was a slave in New York who was freed after converting to Christianity.  His autobiography is 
JOHN JEA, THE LIFE, HISTORY, AND UNPARALLELED SUFFERINGS OF JOHN JEA, THE AFRICAN 
PREACHER (Dodo Press 2010) (1811). 
 130 Jones was a major figure in Philadelphia’s black community in the late eighteenth century.  See 
generally NASH, supra note 122; NEWMAN, supra note 122 (discussing Jones throughout, and noting 
particular discussions in the index).  See also ABSALOM JONES, THANKSGIVING SERMON, 
PREACHED JANUARY 1, 1808 (1808). 
 131 JOHN MARRANT, A JOURNAL OF THE REV. JOHN MARRANT, FROM AUGUST THE 18TH, 1785, 
TO THE 16TH OF MARCH, 1790 (London, J. Taylor and Co. n.d.); JOHN MARRANT, NARRATIVE 
OF THE LORD’S WONDERFUL DEALINGS WITH JOHN MARRANT, A BLACK (4th ed. 1785); JOHN 
MARRANT, SERMON PREACHED ON THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE 1789 (Boston, Bible and Heart 
1789); see also JAMES SIDBURY, BECOMING AFRICAN IN AMERICA: RACE AND NATION IN THE 
EARLY BLACK ATLANTIC 41–42 (2007) (describing Marrant). 
 132 See PETER WILLIAMS, JUN., AN ORATION ON THE ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE; 
DELIVERED IN THE AFRICAN CHURCH, IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, JANUARY 1, 1808 (Samuel 
Wood 1808); NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Peter Williams, Jr., in LIFE STORIES: PROFILES 
OF BLACK NEW YORKERS DURING SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION (n.d.), 
http://www.slaveryinnewyork.org/PDFs/Life_Stories.pdf (last viewed Oct. 2, 2018). 
 133 See generally PHILLIS WHEATLEY, COMPLETE WRITINGS (Vincent Carretta ed., 2001).  Wheatley 
noted in a letter that “civil and religious Liberty” are “so inseparably united, that there is little or 
no Enjoyment of one without the other.”  Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Rev. Samson Occom 
(Feb. 11, 1774), reprinted in supra, at 152–53. 
 134 Historians Catherine Adams and Elizabeth Pleck note, specifically about colonial and 
revolutionary-era New England, 
While there are letters of black men to their former masters, there are none from black 
women. . . .  No black woman kept an account book, a journal, a diary, or published her 
autobiography, to our knowledge . . . .  Thus, the contemporaneous written record about 
black women is less substantial than that for black men, in large part because they were 
much less likely to be literate.  [Moreover], many of the letters written by the few literate 
black women have not survived.  For example, while some of the correspondence of 
Phillis Wheatley to her female friend Obour Tanner, a slave in Newport, has been 
preserved, none of Tanner’s letters to Wheatley have been found. 
  ADAMS & PLECK, supra note 116, at 21. 
 135 In an email exchange, historian of African-American history David Waldstreicher wrote, “In 
researching [my book] Slavery’s Constitution and more generally reading everything on black politics 
and the politics of slavery in this period, I have seen only two examples of direct responses by 
African Americans to the Constitution or the debates around it in 1787–88.”  Email from David 
Waldstreicher, Distinguished Professor of History, Graduate Center, City University of New 
York, to Christina Mulligan, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 14, 2016, 2:00 PM) 
(on file with author); see also DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM 
REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION 154 (1st ed. 2009) (“There is almost no evidence as to what 
African Americans thought about the great compromises or the Grand Federal Processions in 
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are two notable pseudonymous exceptions: a group of self-described “black 
Inhabitants” of Providence, Rhode Island, and a pseudonymous essayist 
“Othello.” 
The “black Inhabitants” gave a handful of public toasts on July 4, 1788, 
later publishing the same in a local newspaper.  Several thousand 
Federalists had gathered to celebrate, and about a thousand rural 
Antifederalists had also shown up to “prevent what they felt was an 
illegitimate planned celebration of ratification in the public square” as 
Rhode Island had not yet ratified the Constitution.136  Historian David 
Waldstreicher writes, “For this very reason—because people were 
watching—the group we know only as the black inhabitants seized the 
opportunity, and put on the first publicized self-consciously alternative 
African American celebration-cum-protest.”137  They toasted, 
1. The Nine States that have adopted the Federal Constitution. 
2. May the Natives of Africa enjoy their natural Privileges unmolested. 
3. May the Freedom of our unfortunate Countrymen (who are wearing the 
Chains of Bondage in different Parts of the World) be restored to them. 
4. May the Event we this Day celebrate enable our Employers to pay us in 
hard Cash for our Labour. 
5. The Merchants and other who take the Lead in recommending 
Restoration of Equity and Peace. 
6. His Excellency General Washington. 
7. The Humane Society of Philadelphia. 
8. Hon. John Brown, Esq. 
9. May Unity prevail throughout all Nations.138 
Waldstreicher describes the larger purpose of the toast as being part of an 
effort by this group of African-Americans to “claim the Constitution as 
 
1787 and 1788.” (footnote omitted)). 
 136  WALDSTREICHER, supra note 135, at 154. 
 137 Id.  
 138 WALDSTREICHER, supra note 135, at 155–56 (citing NEWPORT MERCURY, July 14, 1788; 
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., July 5, 1788).  Waldstreicher characterizes the toast’s 
context: 
The Providence celebrants refused to choose between claiming a right to celebrate as 
“inhabitants” and making clear their bond to their “countrymen” in chains.  They 
refused to pretend they were not interested in local economic issues and the currency 
controversy, even to the point of equating good merchant behavior with the peace that 
Africans the world over deserved.  They suggested a moral and political equivalency 
between the Revolution’s greatest hero and the abolitionists in another city.  And, having 
redrawn the political map to include the world as well as the nation, they raised their 
glass to the prominent federalist who was also Providence’s best-known international 
slave trader and critic of antislavery. 
  WALDSTREICHER, supra note 135, at 155–56. 
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their own . . . in effect to make a new constitution through 
interpretation.”139  
The second commentator, Othello, published a series of essays in The 
American Museum140 in 1788.  Although Othello’s identity is not known, the 
author was likely black, given the essays’ subject matter and the 
pseudonym’s origin.141  Othello condemned the Constitution’s slave-trade 
clause, arguing the role of slavery in the Constitution “will forever diminish 
the luster of their other proceedings, so highly extolled and so justly 
distinguished for their intrinsic value.”142 
Commentary on the Constitution by white women close in time to 
ratification was also rare.  Nonetheless, several white women did produce 
voluminous writings, poems, and letters in the founding era.143  Significant 
among them were first lady Abigail Adams,144 Alexander Hamilton’s sister-
in-law Angelica Schuyler Church,145 poet Elizabeth Graeme Fergusson,146 
 
 139 MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FAILURE 45 (1998); WALDSTREICHER, supra note 135, at 156 & n.4 (alteration in original) 
(quoting BRANDON, supra, at 45).  
 140 The American Museum was a monthly Philadelphia paper published by Irish immigrant Mathew 
Carey from January 1787 to December 1792. See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, (John P. Kaminski et al. eds, Univ. of 
Virginia Press 2009). 
 141 The titular character in William Shakespeare’s Othello is and was historically understood to be 
black or dark-skinned. See Michael Niell, Introduction to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE 
MOOR OF VENICE 45–47 (Michael Neill ed., 2006) (focusing on the racial themes in Othello and 
how they were explored over time). 
 142 NEGRO ORATORS AND THEIR ORATIONS 16–19 (Carter G. Woodson ed., reprint 1969) (1925) 
(cited in WALDSTREICHER, supra note 135, at 154 n.2); see also MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S 
CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 80–81 (2016) (describing Othello’s essay). 
 143 See, e.g., THE DIARY OF ELIZABETH DRINKER: THE LIFE CYCLE OF AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
WOMAN (Elaine Forman Crane ed., Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 2d ed. 2010); THE POSTHUMOUS 
WORKS OF ANN ELIZA BLEEKER IN PROSE AND VERSE, TO WHICH IS ADDED A COLLECTION 
OF ESSAYS, PROSE AND POLITICAL, BY MARGARETTA V. FAUGERES (New York, T. & J. Swords 
1793), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Posthumous_Works_of_Ann_Eliza_Bleecker; 
Miscellanies, Moral and Instructive, in Prose and Verse; Collected from Various Authors, for the Use of Schools, and 
Improvement of Young Persons of Both Sexes (Milcah Martha Moore ed., Burlington, N.J., Neale & 
Kammerer 1796), reprinted in MILCAH MARTHA MOORE’S BOOK: A COMMONPLACE BOOK FROM 
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 113 (Catherine La Courreye Blecki & Karin A. Wulf eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter MOORE];.  Among the significant texts by white women that just predate the 
revolution are agriculturalist and plantation manager Eliza Lucas Pinckney’s letterbook, 
LETTERBOOK OF ELIZA LUCAS PINCKNEY, 1739–1762 (Elise Pinckney ed., 1972), and the journal 
of Esther Burr, mother of Aaron Burr, ESTHER BURR’S JOURNAL (Jeremiah Eames Rankin ed., 
1903), https://books.google.com/books?id=iW04AAAAMAAJ. 
 144 See FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2017) (search for 
Author: “Adams, Abigail”). 
 145 See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004) (discussed throughout); A Guide to the Papers 
of Angelica Schuyler Church, U. OF VA. LIBR., http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=uva-
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novelist Hannah Webster Foster,147 poet Hannah Griffitts,148 poet Sarah 
Wentworth Morton,149 early feminist author Judith Sargent Murray,150 
novelist Susanna Rowson,151 poet Annis Boudinot Stockton,152 and poet 
Susanna Wright.153  Nancy F. Cott’s work has also canvassed many more, 
largely private, writings by middle-to-upper class white women in the late-
eighteenth century.154 
Among the female figures who published significant political writings on 
issues related to the Constitution and Bill of Rights were author Hannah 
Adams,155 essayist Elizabeth Ryland Priestley, and Antifederalist writer 
 
sc/viu00003.xml (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
 146 See MOORE, supra note 143 (including some of Fergusson’s writings); see also ANNE M. 
OUSTERHOUT, THE MOST LEARNED WOMAN IN AMERICA: A LIFE OF ELIZABETH GRAEME 
FERGUSSON (2004). 
 147 HANNAH WEBSTER FOSTER, THE BOARDING SCHOOL; LESSONS OF A PRECEPTRESS TO HER 
PUPILS (Boston, Press of Putnam & Hunt 1798), https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55558; 
HANNAH WEBSTER FOSTER, THE COQUETTE; OR, THE HISTORY OF ELIZA WHARTON (1797), 
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12431. 
 148 See MOORE, supra note 143 (including some of Griffitts’s writing).  Griffitts used the pseudonym 
“Fidelia” when her poetry was published in Moore’s book.  See ALAN SHUCARD, AMERICAN 
POETRY: THE PURITANS THROUGH WALT WHITMAN (1988). 
 149 BEACON HILL. A LOCAL POEM, HISTORIC AND DESCRIPTIVE (Boston, Manning & Loring 1797) 
(unattributed poem by Sarah Wentworth Morton); PHILENIA, OUABI: OR THE VIRTUES OF 
NATURE, AN INDIAN TALE IN FOUR CANTOS (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1790) 
(Philenia was the pseudonym of Sarah Wentworth Morton); THE VIRTUES OF SOCIETY. A TALE, 
FOUNDED ON FACT (Boston, Manning & Loring 1799) (unattributed poem by Sarah Wentworth 
Morton); SARAH WENTWORTH MORTON, MY MIND AND ITS THOUGHTS, IN SKETCHES, 
FRAGMENTS, AND ESSAYS (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1823), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=RAofAAAAMAAJ; Constantia, Invocation to Hope, 
MASSACHUSETTS MAGAZINE, July 1789, at 449 (Constantia was an early pseudonym of Sarah 
Wentworth Morton, abandoned later because Judith Sargent Murray had prior use of the 
pseudonym); Sarah Wentworth Morton, The African Chief, in 2 SPECIMENS OF AMERICAN POETRY 
75 (Samuel Kettell ed., 1829) (reprinted from Columbian Centinel (June 9, 1792)), 
http://www.bartleby.com/96/164.html. 
 150 Judith Sargent Murray, On the Equality of the Sexes, MASSACHUSETTS MAGAZINE, April 1790, 
http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/murray/equality/equality.html; see Judith Sargent Murray 
Archive, JUDITH SARGENT MURRAY SOC’Y, http://www.jsmsociety.com/JSM_Archive.html 
(including Sargent Murray’s writings) (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 151 See ELLEN B. BRANDT, SUSANNA HASWELL ROWSON, AMERICA’S FIRST BEST-SELLING 
NOVELIST (1975); STEVEN EPLEY, SUSANNA ROWSON: SENTIMENTAL PROPHET OF EARLY 
AMERICAN LITERATURE (2016); Papers of Susanna Rownson 1770–1879, U. VA. LIBR., 
http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u3957056 (last visited Dec. 11, 2017) (click on “GUIDE 
TO THE COLLECTIONS AVAILABLE ONLINE”). 
 152 See ONLY FOR THE EYE OF A FRIEND: THE POEMS OF ANNIS BOUDINOT STOCKTON (Carla 
Mulford ed., 1995). 
 153 See MOORE, supra note 143; see also Frederick B. Tolles, Susanna Wright, in NOTABLE AMERICAN 
WOMEN: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Edward T. James et al. eds., 1971). 
 154 COTT, supra note 65; id. at 207 (“List of Women’s Documents Consulted”).  
 155 Adams wrote several nonfiction books in her life.  See HANNAH ADAMS, AN ALPHABETICAL 
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Mercy Otis Warren.  Adams’ A Summary History of New-England included a 
largely descriptive discussion of the Constitution’s structure and ratification, 
and a brief comment on religious liberty in the states.156  
Priestley wrote two essays on free speech, which appeared in politician 
and academic Thomas Cooper’s Political Essays—part one of On the Propriety 
and Expediency of Unlimited Enquiry and a reply to Cooper’s essay Observations 
on the Fast Day.157  On the Propriety reads to a modern ear as an endorsement 
of unrestrained free speech.  Priestley begins writing, “There is perhaps no 
political question so important to the interest of society, as that of the 
operation and unrestrained discussion on all subjects whatever.”158  
“[K]nowledge is the most important instrument of human welfare.  But it 
can exist in an eminent degree, and on a stable foundation, only by 
discussion; and its increase and extension will be proportioned to the 
freedom of discussion.”159  Bad speech was of little concern to Priestly 
because speech that espoused incorrect or immoral positions would 
eventually lose adherents.160  Priestley went on to argue that “free enquiry” 
 
COMPENDIUM OF THE VARIOUS SECTS WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN THE WORLD FROM THE 
BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ÆRA TO THE PRESENT DAY (Boston, B. Edes & Sons 1784) (also 
published as “A View of Religions,” in 1791 and 1801 and “Dictionary of Religions,” in 1817); 
HANNAH ADAMS, A MEMOIR OF MISS HANNAH ADAMS (Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832); 
HANNAH ADAMS, A SUMMARY HISTORY OF NEW-ENGLAND (n.p., H. Mann & F.H. Adams 
1799); HANNAH ADAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS (Boston, John Eliot, Jr. 1812); HANNAH 
ADAMS, LETTERS ON THE GOSPELS (Cambridge, Hilliard & Metcalf 1824).  
 156 ADAMS, A SUMMARY HISTORY OF NEW-ENGLAND, supra note 155, at 492–499 (describing the 
federal Constitution); id. at 497 (“Religious liberty is a fundamental principle in the constitutions 
of the respective states.  Some, indeed, retain a distinction between Christians and others, with 
respect to their eligibility to office; but the idea of raising one sect of Protestants to a legal 
preeminence, is universally reprobated.”). 
 157 Priestley Toulmin, The Descendents of Joseph Priestley, L.L.D., F.R.S., 32 NORTHUMBERLAND 
COUNTY HIST. SOC’Y PROC. 1, 15 (1994); Eugene Volokh, Elizabeth Ryland Priestley, Early American 
Author on Free Speech, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 382, 382 (2009).  Priestley’s writings are reprinted in 
4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 408–413 (2009) and 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 449–492 (2009).  They 
initially appeared in THOMAS COOPER, POLITICAL ESSAYS (2d ed. Philadelphia, R. Campbell 
1800).  Priestley was the daughter-in-law of Cooper’s close friend, Joseph Priestley.  Volokh, supra, 
at 382.  There is not a great deal more biographical information about Elizabeth Ryland 
Priestley.  In a 2009 introduction to the reprint of Cooper’s Political Essays in the N.Y.U. Journal 
of Law & Liberty, Eugene Volokh observed that little had been written about her, although she is 
sometimes mentioned in connection with her prominent father-in-law Joseph.  Id. at 383–84.  
Volokh expressed hope that “some historian can uncover more on this intriguing woman, if 
something survives to be uncovered.”  Id. at 385. 
 158 Thomas Cooper & Elizabeth Ryland Priestley, On the Propriety and Expediency of Unlimited Enquiry, 
reprinted in 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 447, 449 (2009) (emphasis omitted).   
 159 Id. at 450 (emphasis omitted). 
 160 Id. at 451. 
It may perhaps be urged, and plausibly urged, that the welfare of the community may 
sometimes, and in some cases, require certain restrictions on this unlimited right of 
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would diminish the need for violent revolution,161 citing the peaceful 
change from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution for 
support.162  She emphasized speech as an alternative to violence,163 and the 
superiority of resolving theological disputes through discussion rather than 
indulging in religious persecution.164 
In contrast to Priestley’s relative obscurity, Mercy Otis Warren is by far 
the most prominent female political writer of the founding era.  In addition 
to her three-volume history of the American revolution published in 
1805,165 and numerous politically-charged plays and poems,166 she also 
wrote an Antifederalist pamphlet, Observations on the New Constitution and on the 
Federal and State Conventions, in 1788, under the pseudonym “A Columbian 
Patriot.”167  In her pamphlet, Warren expressed concerns related to the 
 
enquiry: that publications exciting to insurrection or immorality for instance, ought to be 
checked or suppressed.  Not to dwell upon the difficulty of ascertaining the proper 
boundary of such restrictions, it may be observed, that opinions palpably false and of bad 
tendency, will never be generally received, and their promulgation must eventually do 
good.  The mass of talents, of knowledge, and of respectability will, in every country, 
from interest as well as principle, be on the side of good order and morality.  There can 
be few who, from ignorance or design, will be tempted publicly to support opinions 
inimical to the general welfare; and in cases where it may occur, the investigation that 
will ensue, and the confutation of such doctrines however plausible (which in the end 
must take place if they really are unfounded and of mischievous tendency) will establish 
truth more decisively, than could be effected in any other way. 
  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 161 Id. at 453 (“Were enquiry free, the convulsions and excesses of revolution, so deprecated by the 
best friends of liberty, would hardly be known; for the nature and necessity of the change 
proposed, would be understood through the whole society previous to its taking place; a remark 
which the example of this country has already illustrated.”). 
 162 Id. at 454. 
 163 Id. (“Governments tenacious of an unaltered existence, would perhaps do well to consider that 
these restrictions serve only to excite more ardent opposition, and that the irritation of restraint 
carries men beyond what in other circumstances, they would have thought of.”); Id. at 455 (“All 
the wars and persecutions that have desolated the earth, and exhibited man as more savage and 
ferocious than the worst species of brute animals, have arisen from the want of diffused knowledge 
and popular enquiry.”). 
 164 Id. at 456. 
 165 MERCY OTIS WARREN, HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND TERMINATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Lester H. Cohen ed., 1989) (1805).  
 166 See, e.g., MERCY OTIS WARREN, POEMS, DRAMATIC AND MISCELLANEOUS (Boston, I. Thomas 
& E.T. Andrews 1790).  Alexander Hamilton once said of her work, “In the career of dramatic 
composition at least, female genius in the United States has outstripped the Male.”  ROSEMARIE 
ZAGARRI, A WOMAN’S DILEMMA: MERCY OTIS WARREN AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
141 (2d ed. 2015). 
 167 Authorship of Observations was not attributed to Warren until her descendent Charles discovered a 
reference to it in correspondence between Warren and British historian Catherine Macauley; the 
pamphlet had previously been attributed to Elbridge Gerry.  KATE DAVIES, CATHARINE 
MACAULAY AND MERCY OTIS WARREN: THE REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC AND THE POLITICS 
OF GENDER 292 (2005); 45 MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS 335 (OCT. 
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structure of federal government,  
There are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers, they seem to 
be left as a boundless ocean . . . it would be an Herculean labour to 
attempt to describe the dangers with which they are replete. 
The Executive and the Legislative are so dangerously blended as to give 
just cause of alarm . . . .168  
Warren was keenly concerned with the potential within the 
Constitution to erode freedom and rights, specifically calling out the 
absence of a right to trial by jury in civil cases, and expressing concern 
about the right of the federal government to maintain a standing army.169  
She criticized the ease with which elected government officials might stay in 
power for long periods of time, and the large number of individuals each 
representative would be responsible for.170  And like many Antifederalists, 
Warren expressed the need for a bill of rights to be adopted.171  She 
lamented, “There is no security in the profered system, either for the rights 
of conscience or the liberty of the Press . . . .”172  Throughout the pamphlet, 
Warren was not only critical of the strength of the proposed federal 
government, but also of the secretive manner in which the Constitution was 
drafted.173 
2.  Potential Paradigm Shifts 
While authors like Adams, Othello, Priestley, and Warren directly 
addressed the Constitution or constitutional rights, their writings hardly 
send tremors through the fabric of constitutional interpretation today.  For 
many reasons, this is comforting; lack of evidence that sub-communities 
understood the Constitution in wildly divergent ways should make us more 
confident that the existing, well-trod evidence of constitutional meaning 
was roughly representative of the founding public’s view.  And it may be 
tempting to read Adams, Othello, Priestley, Warren, and others, and 
 
1911–JUNE 1912); Maud Macdonald Hutcheson, Mercy Warren, 1728–1814, 10 WM. & MARY Q. 
378, 393 (1953). 
 168 A Columbian Patriot, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions 
(Boston 1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, at 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
Brooklyn, N.Y.1888), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1670 (mistakenly crediting Elbridge Gerry 
with authorship of Warren’s pamphlet). 
 169 Id. at 9–11. 
 170 Id. at 11–12. 
 171 Id. at 12–13. 
 172 Id. at 9. 
 173 Id. at 14. 
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presume that finding more obscure political writings by women and people 
of color will not reveal sufficiently significant revelations to be worth the 
research effort expended.  But even individual, brief, and relatively obscure 
writings have the potential to dramatically alter how we understand the 
Constitution.  The remainder of this subpart explores two potentially 
“paradigm-shifting” writings, by Absalom Jones in 1799, and a petition by 
several black Americans in 1853.  
a. Absalom Jones on the Slave Clauses and Bill of Rights 
In 1799, black minister Absalom Jones drafted a petition to Congress 
calling for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  He wrote, 
In the Constitution, and the Fugitive bill, no mention is made of Black 
people or Slaves—therefore if the Bill of Rights, or the declaration of 
Congress are of any validity, we beseech that as we are men, we may be 
admitted to partake of the Liberties and unalienable Rights therein held 
forth—firmly believing that the extending of Justice and equity to all 
Classes, would be a means of drawing down the blessings of Heaven upon 
this Land, for the Peace and Prosperity of which, and the real happiness of 
every member of the Community, we fervently pray.174 
Jones’s petition anticipates Lysander Spooner’s more comprehensive 1845 
pamphlet, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, which argued that the 
Constitution did not condone slavery because each of the clauses that 
appeared to regulate slavery could be interpreted to have other referents.175  
Spooner argued that “other persons” in the three-fifths clause referred to 
aliens,176 that the “Importation of . . . persons” referred to the importation 
of “foreigners” into the country,177 and that “Person[s] held in Service or 
Labour” referred to convicts and indentured servants.178 
 
 
 174 Absalom Jones, A Petition of Absalom Jones and Others (1799), reprinted in LANDMARK DOCUMENTS 
ON THE U.S. CONGRESS 92, 93 (Raymond W. Smock ed., 1999). 
 175 LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1845). 
 176 SPOONER, supra note 175, at 44–54, 247–55, 265–70; Barnett, supra note 49, at 994–96; see also 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (declaring that representative and direct taxes would be apportioned by 
population, “which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, 
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons”). 
 177 SPOONER, supra note 175, at 81–82; Barnett, supra note 49, at 996–98; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 9 (preventing Congress from prohibiting the “Migration or Importation of such Persons as any 
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit” until 1808);. 
 178 SPOONER, supra note 175, at 70–72; Barnett, supra note 49, at 998–99; see also U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 2 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping to 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour . . . .”);. 
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Spooner’s discussion, to characterize it in present-day interpretive 
terms, advocated for understanding the Constitution according to its 
original meaning rather than the original intent of the authors.  Spooner 
acknowledged that the Constitution’s authors intended the three-fifths 
clause, the importation clause, and the service or labour clause to refer to 
slaves.  However, he also argued that authorial intention did not determine 
the meaning of the Constitution.179  Rather, the Constitution’s meaning 
was “the meaning which its words, interpreted by sound legal rules of 
interpretation, express.”180  Later, in an 1860 speech, Frederick Douglass 
echoed Spooner, reasoning,  
[T]he intentions of those who framed the Constitution, be they good or 
bad, for slavery or against slavery, are to be respected so far, and so far 
only, as will find those intentions plainly stated in the Constitution. . . .  It 
was what they said that was adopted by the people, not what they were 
ashamed or afraid to say, and really omitted to say.181 
For a public meaning originalist, the argument of Spooner’s 
Unconstitutionality of Slavery struggles to overcome the apparent reality that 
everyone in the framing period “knew that the Constitution sanctioned 
slavery.”182  If everyone recognized that the three-fifths clause, importation 
clause, and service or labour clause referred to slavery, then Spooner’s 
pamphlet would not establish that the “original public meaning” did not 
include slavery.  Instead, Spooner’s pamphlet would be perhaps better 
understood as a rhetorical tool for nineteenth-century abolitionists, 
highlighting the hypocrisy within the Constitution. 
Jones’s 1799 petition, however, makes Spooner’s argument more 
persuasive on the merits.  Jones wrote the petition only a little more than a 
 
 179 SPOONER, supra note 175, at 222  (“We must admit that the constitution, of itself, independently 
of the actual intentions of the people, expresses some certain, fixed, definite, and legal intentions; 
else the people themselves would express no intentions by agreeing to it.” (emphasis omitted)); id. 
at 220 (“[I]f the intentions could be assumed independently of the words, the words would be of 
no use, and the laws of course would not be written.”). 
 180 SPOONER, supra note 175, at 223.  Barnett elaborates,  
By [Spooner’s] reasoning if the people ratified a document that failed to clearly 
authorize slavery and which omits all explicit reference to the practice using the most 
obvious and well-known term to describe it, we cannot presume that these enigmatic 
references are to slavery if some other meaning can reasonably be assigned to them.   
  Barnett, supra note 49, at 993. 
 181 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?, Speech Delivered 
in Glasgow, Scotland, March 26, 1860, in PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 207 (3d ed. 1992); see also 
WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 205 (1991) (explaining that Douglass’s arguments 
“were those of Lysander Spooner and William Goodell as he had acknowledged at the time of his 
change of heart about the Constitution in 1851”). 
 182 Barnett, supra note 49, at 1007. 
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decade after the ratification of the Constitution, emphasizing,  
In the Constitution, and the Fugitive bill, no mention is made of Black 
people or Slaves—therefore if the Bill of Rights, or the declaration of 
Congress are of any validity, we beseech that as we are men, we may be 
admitted to partake of the Liberties and unalienable Rights therein held 
forth . . . .183  
Jones is arguing that because the Constitution does not explicitly 
designate different classes of rights among white or black people, or among 
slaves and non-slaves, its public meaning provides that constitutional rights 
belong equally to all people, regardless of their color or status.  His 
language further raises the question of whether it truly was universally 
acknowledged that constitutional rights did not apply to slaves. Even if 
excluding slaves was the intent of the Drafters, contemporary readers might 
have believed that the drafters’ reticence to name slavery had inadvertently 
resulted in their writing a document that did not have the intended legal 
effect.  Jones raised these issues at a time nearly contemporaneous with the 
Constitution’s passage; that Jones’s petition was sent to Congress suggests 
that he believed his interpretation constituted a reasonable legal position—
perhaps even was the best interpretation of the Constitution given the 
conventions of the day.  
The Reconstruction Amendments moot the question of whether Jones 
and other members of the public genuinely believed the Constitution 
protected the rights of slaves whenever it protected the rights of “persons” 
or “people.”  However, Jones’s legal argument illustrates how attention to 
the writings and views of parties beyond “the usual suspects” has the 
potential to highlight the existence of genuinely-held, alternative 
interpretations of constitutional text.  
 b. 1853 Petition on the Militia Power and on Privileges and Immunities 
In June 1853, “[s]ixty-five colored citizens of Boston” petitioned the 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention to amend the Massachusetts 
Constitution “to remove the disabilities of colored citizens from holding 
military commissions and serving in the militia.”184  The petition was 
rejected, in part on the grounds that it could not be granted without putting 
Massachusetts law in conflict with the federal Constitution and with federal 
 
 183 Jones, supra note 174, at 93. 
 184 WM. C. NELL, THE COLORED PATRIOTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 103 (Boston, Robert 
F. Wallcut 1855). 
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law.185  A further petition was then submitted by several “colored citizens of 
Massachusetts,” including William Cooper Nell,186 arguing that this 
conclusion was unwarranted because the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
required the equality of all free citizens, and because Congress lacked the 
power to segregate the militias.  While 1853 is hardly contemporaneous 
with the founding, this petition provides a detailed example of black 
Americans making legal arguments concerning several clauses of the 
Constitution.  Moreover, it provides evidence of how the phrase “Privileges 
and Immunities” was understood prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Regarding Privileges and Immunities, the petitioners quoted the 
Clause187 and interpreted it, writing,  
It is not possible to make a more unequivocal recognition of the equality of 
all citizens; and, therefore, whatever contravenes or denies it, in the shape 
of legislation, is manifestly unconstitutional.  Whatever may have been the 
compromises of the Constitution, in regard to those held in bondage as 
chattel slaves, none were ever made, or proposed, respecting the rights and 
liberties of citizens.188  
This characterization reads the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a 
non-discrimination clause, not merely among citizens of different states, but 
among citizens who are all residents of the same state.  Additionally, while 
the petition acquiesces to reading the Constitution as contemplating 
different statuses for free people and enslaved people, it asserts that the 
Constitution draws no status distinction between free whites and free 
blacks, and that accordingly the same rights must be recognized in both 
populations. 
The petition goes on to explore the scope of congressional power under 
the militia clause, implicitly articulating a boundary around the reach of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  It explains,  
It is true that, by the United States Constitution, Congress is 
empowered “to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the 
militia”; it is also true, that Congress, in “organizing” the militia, has 
authorized none but “white” citizens to be enrolled therein; nevertheless, it 
is not less true, that the law of Congress, making this unnatural distinction, 
is, in this particular, unconstitutional, and therefore ought to exert no 
controlling force over the legislation of any of the States.  To organize the 
 
 185 Id. at 107. 
 186 Id. at 110. 
 187 “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  
 188 NELL, supra note 184, at 109. 
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militia of the country is one thing; to dishonor and outrage a portion of the 
citizens, on any ground, is a very different thing.  To do the former, 
Congress is clothed with ample constitutional authority; to accomplish the 
latter, it has no power to legislate, and resort must be had, and has been 
had, to usurpation and tyranny.189 
The boundary on the militia power being articulated is not immediately 
crystal clear—Congress can “organize” the militia but not “dishonor and 
outrage a portion of the citizens, on any ground.”  But in the context of the 
Pivileges and Immunities Clause discussion, we might surmise that the 
“dishonor and outrage” language might refer to a dishonor or outrage that 
comes from treating citizens unequally.  The petition’s argument thus also 
implicitly assumes that the Necessary and Proper Clause, which permits 
Congress to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers,”190 does not give Congress the 
authority to segregate the states’ militias in the name of “organizing” them.191  
C.  Addressing Alienation 
The previous two sections explored practical efforts originalists could 
undertake to improve originalist interpretation, through debiasing and 
broadening the evidence of founding-era meaning considered. A final 
approach to ameliorating originalism’s race and gender problems feels less 
concrete, but is still crucially important: addressing the feelings of alienation 
that women and minorities may feel towards the Constitution in general, 
and to originalism in particular.    
The Reconstruction Amendments and the Nineteenth Amendment 
arguably correct the early evils of the Constitution, rendering the document 
sufficiently just to command authority.192  But a person’s feelings about the 
Constitution are not necessarily discretely responsive to arguments about 
 
 189 Id. 
 190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 191 The text of Congress’s Section 8 powers over the militia does not explicitly give the federal 
government the power to determine who may be a member.  Rather, Congress is granted the 
power to “provide for calling forth the Militia” and “for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cls. 15–16. 
 192 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 22, at 108 (“If enforced according to their terms, these 
amendments would have constituted substantially to a ‘new birth of freedom’ for African 
Americans that would have provided them with largely the same rights that white males enjoyed 
in 1789.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 111 (“But like the exclusion of African Americans, the 
exclusion of women has been substantially corrected.”). 
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political legitimacy and substantive outcomes.  A person’s moral sentiments 
about the Constitution are generated in large part by how they apprehend 
the document’s history.  Some think about the Constitution and engage in 
what is derogatorily referred to as “Founder worship,” speaking as though 
the Founding Fathers could do no wrong.  Some at the other extreme, 
motivated by Founders’ and Framers’ slave holding and ultimate 
sanctioning of slavery during the Constitution’s drafting, embrace a 
narrative of constitutional contamination, rejecting the notion that the 
Constitution can have any meaningful claim on behavior today.  
But there are different stories about the Constitution that we can tell.  
Jack Balkin presents the story of America, and of America’s Constitution, as 
a story about potential redemption—“a story about the eventual fulfillment 
of promises made long ago.”193 For Balkin, the existence of constitutional 
evil in the past or the present does not necessarily mean we should reject 
the Constitution.  Rather, he sees the political struggles of the past and 
present as part of a continuing struggle to create a democratic culture, that 
is necessarily morally compromised.194  “A narrative of redemption . . . 
assumes that we exist, and have always existed, in a fallen condition.  We 
live in compromises with the evils of the past, and we are compromised by 
them.”195  Yet, “[o]ver time we seek to free ourselves from the sins and 
inadequacies of the past, and hold ourselves ever more true to those best 
parts that have always been within us. . . .  We the People made a promise 
to ourselves in the past that we strive to fulfill.”196  Balkin frames a narrative 
of “constitutional redemption” as being about “Americans as a people”—
“constitutive narratives around which and through which people can 
imagine themselves as a people, with shared hopes, memories, goals, 
aspirations, and ambitions.”197  
Randy Barnett similarly embraces the notion of “redeeming” the 
Constitution,198 as well as “restoring” the just founding principles that were 
incompletely actualized in the founding era.199  For Barnett, the 
Constitution has a narrative arc.  It begins with,  
[A] profound and radical idea that was born in the American Revolution 
and matured in the great national struggle over slavery: that government is 
 
 193 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 27 (2011). 
 194 Id. at 27–28. 
 195 Id. at 27. 
 196 Id. at 27–28. 
 197 Id. at 30–31 (emphasis omitted). 
 198 RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND 
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 247, 257 (2016).  
 199 Id. at 250–51. 
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instituted by the people as individuals, that presidents and congressmen are 
the servants of the people as individuals, and that the just powers of 
government must protect the rights of each and every person.200  
Barnett emphasizes that the Constitution “can, if followed, secure the 
liberty and sovereignty of We the People—each and every one.”201 
Choosing among narratives of constitutional contamination and 
alienation, or of restoration or redemption, is important because those 
choices both represent and order how we understand our place in 
American society.  While Barnett’s restoration narrative and Balkin’s 
redemption narrative acknowledge the evils in America’s past, they each 
view the American experiment as a struggle to actualize a society that 
protects justice for all.  Even if that project is not fully realized, the 
Constitution can represent those laudable and radical aspirations.  The 
contamination narrative, by comparison, contemplates that some 
populations are too alienated from the Constitution and its compromised 
origins—and by extension, to originalist interpretation—to understand and 
embrace it as a source of guidance or inspiration today. 
The story we tell ourselves about our political origins and evolution 
matters.  As Balkin pithily explains, it is not “just a story.”202  Rather, it “is 
true for you because it is part of you, because you see yourself as part of it.  
If you are committed to a narrative in this way, . . . it becomes more than a 
story.  It becomes a way of life.”203  In the United States, how one feels 
about the Constitution can be an important part of how one sees one’s role 
in society.  Does the document represent the ongoing struggle for liberty, 
equality, or justice?  Is it a symbol and tool of oppression, which continues 
to serve as a divisive wedge every time someone talks about how wise and 
good the Founders were?204  Is it both?  Even at the time of ratification, 
competing narratives were in play.  Particularly when it came to 
characterizing the Constitution’s relationship with slavery pre-ratification, 
Federalists “said different things, with different emphases, to different 
audiences,”205 defending the Constitution “as proslavery in some states and 
 
 200 Id. at 247. 
 201 Id. at 258 (emphasis added).  
 202 BALKIN, supra note 193, at 32.  
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 204 Cf. ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER 
THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 65 (2006) (characterizing some 
scholars as “echo[ing] the Progressives’ understanding of the realization of democracy in America 
as a struggle against founding principles and American history as a series of conflicts . . . between 
white males in positions of power and women, Native Americans, slaves, and the poor”). 
 205 WALDSTREICHER, supra note 135, at 133. 
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as antislavery in others.”206  
What is crucial for considering the problem of constitutional alienation 
is to recognize that, while the denotative meaning of the constitutional text 
may be fixed, the connotative meaning of the text is changeable and 
changing.  The following two Sections elaborate on why the Constitution’s 
social meaning can be changed, and on how originalists can mitigate 
constitutional alienation in the present. 
1.  Separating Author from Text  
When we discuss why we love or feel alienated from the Constitution, 
we often end up emphasizing the merits and flaws of the people responsible 
for the Constitution rather than the text, and the values embedded in the 
text, itself.  Recognizing this connection between author and text provides 
an opportunity to recognize that judgments about the Framers do not have 
to track one’s feelings about the Constitution or how to interpret it.  Was 
George Washington a role model for relinquishing power like Cincinnatus 
and freeing his slaves in his will?207  Or was he a monster for pulling out his 
slaves’ teeth to make his dentures?208  These questions are worth discussing, 
 
 206 Id. at 150.  
 207 Richard Allen wrote a eulogy for Washington, which was published in the Philadelphia Gazette on 
December 31, 1799.  In his eulogy, Allen characterized Washington as a “sympathising friend” to 
black people, emphasizing Washington’s decision to free his slaves in his will.  Allen wrote,  
He whose wisdom the nations revered thought we had a right to liberty.  Unbiased by 
the popular opinion of the state [Virginia] in which is the memorable Mount Vernon he 
dared to do his duty, and wipe off the only stain with which man could ever reproach 
him.  
. . . . 
 Deeds like these are not common. 
  Richard Allen, Eulogy for Washington, reprinted in LIFT EVERY VOICE: AFRICAN AMERICAN 
ORATORY, 1787–1900, at 56, 58 (Philip S. Foner & Robert James Branham eds., 1998).  
Manisha Sinha interprets Allen’s speech, claiming, “Allen sought to appropriate Washington’s 
legacy for abolition.”  SINHA, supra note 142, at 149.  Shortly after Washington’s death, Prince 
Hall’s African Lodge also expressed appreciation for Washington, a fellow mason, by adopting “a 
motion that the Lodge would walk on February 22” to commemorate his life.  WESLEY, supra note 
126, at 137.   
 208 See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 438–39 (2010) (describing Washington’s use of 
dentures made from human teeth).  Jamal Greene reflects on this revelation: 
I was surprised to learn recently, from Ron Chernow’s illuminating biography, that 
George Washington’s teeth might have been pulled from the mouths of his slaves.  I 
suppose I should not have been surprised.  I certainly knew that Washington kept slaves.  
I even knew that he was capable of uncommon barbarity with respect to his slaves, 
forcing them, for example, to clear swamps in the bitterest of winter chill.  But even as a 
relatively sophisticated consumer of American legal and political history, I have been 
partly captured by the romantic myth around Washington.  He paid for the teeth, it 
seems, but the fact that he bought them from someone from whom he was extracting free 
labor on pain of lash (or worse) cannot help but lower Washington another notch in my 
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and how someone answers them and why reveals important aspects of how 
they render moral judgments, what they value, and whether they grade 
people’s character “on a historical curve.”209  But these questions do not 
have to have a close relationship to whether originalism is a desirable 
method of constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, the movement from 
“original intent originalism” to “original public meaning originalism” 
demonstrates a commitment to the notion that the character and beliefs of 
the Framers are not particularly relevant to the meaning of the 
Constitution.  By focusing on the public meaning of the Constitution, the 
subjective intents of, and the character and desires of, the Constitution’s 
Framers can be stripped out of the interpretive story.  All that remains is 
the text and how the public received it, and the text may be better than the 
men behind it. 
To illustrate the separation between author and text, consider one of 
the most important founding-era sentences that exists in tension with the 
life of its author—the Declaration of Independence’s claim that “all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”210  This sentence plays a powerful role in the present-day belief 
that at the root of the American experiment is the notion that all people 
have equal rights and an equal claim to freedom and self-determination.  It 
was also written by Thomas Jefferson, who held slaves, fathered children 
with one of his slaves, Sally Hemings, and clearly articulated his belief in 
the inferiority of black people in his Notes on the State of Virginia.211  
Nonetheless, it is Jefferson who tells us in a document that rings throughout 
the ages, “all men are created equal” and have the “unalienable Right” to 
 
imagination. 
  Greene, supra note 1, at 517 (internal citations omitted). 
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NEGRO, 1550–1812, at 429–81 (2d ed. 1968) (describing Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia and 
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“Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” 
Must Jefferson’s relationship to the Declaration compromise its 
aspirational language?  Consider one reaction, James Forten’s 1813 Letters 
from a Man of Color, in which he writes, 
W[e] hold this truth to be self-evident, that GOD created all men equal, 
and is one of the most prominent features in the Declaration of 
Independence, and in that glorious fabrick of collected wisdom, our noble 
Constitution.  This idea embraces the Indian and the European, the 
Savage and the Saint, the Peruvian and the Laplander, the white Man and 
the African, and whatever measures are adopted subversive of this 
inestimable privilege, are in direct violation of the letter and the spirit of 
our Constitution, and become subject to the animadversion of all, 
particularly those who are deeply interested in the measure.212 
Forten does not spit on the Declaration and the Constitution because of 
their compromised authors.  Rather, he focuses only on the text, and calls 
out actions as deviant that fail to live up to what he understands to be the 
documents’ stated values.  
Forten’s choice to focus on the Declaration and Constitution’s texts 
rather than origins finds support among later literary theorists.  In 1919, 
T.S. Eliot argued, “[H]onest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed 
not upon the poet but upon the poetry.”213  Later, in the 1968 essay Death of 
the Author,214 Roland Barthes set out “to show that the author is not 
conserved in the text,”215 arguing that: 
[W]riting is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin.  Writing 
is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the 
negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body 
writing. 
. . . . 
. . . [I]t is language which speaks, not the author . . . .216  
William Gass more gently accepts the creative role of authors without 
deifying them, characterizing the “death of the author” as “a decline in 
authority, in theological power, as if Zeus were stripped of his thunderbolts 
and swans, perhaps residing on Olympus still, but now living in a camper 
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and cooking with propane.  He is, but he is no longer a god.”217  
Ultimately, for Gass, “the elevation or removal of the author is a social and 
political gesture, not an esthetic one.”218 
By being careful to contextualize and circumscribe the role the 
Constitution’s authors play in determining the meaning of the 
constitutional text, public meaning originalists not only “do originalism” 
better, but also further separate the associations the present-day public has 
with the biographies of the Constitution’s Framers and from the text itself.  
This separation allows Balkin and Barnett’s narrative of redemption and 
restoration of principle to ring truer.  The Constitution was born flawed, 
instantiating many important principles while also facilitating slavery and 
failing to provide the tools to secure political equality for black Americans 
and others.  Only by constitutional amendment was slavery ended, were 
woman and all people of color politically enfranchised, and was the federal 
government granted the power to prevent abuses of minorities by state and 
local governments.  It is this progression toward actualizing the laudable 
principles found in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, 
regardless of what anyone in particular thought of those principles at the 
founding, and toward eliminating the Constitution’s immoral elements, that 
can make the Constitution worth defending and working with.  No matter 
how insightful the Framers were, no matter how sympathetic one might be 
to their positions, we should all agree the original, unamended Constitution 
is not worth defending today, precisely because it facilitated the protection 
of the institution of slavery and allowed for the disenfranchisement of large 
portions of the population.  Similarly, no matter how flawed and 
compromised the Framers were in how they conducted their personal lives 
or in how they viewed black Americans, women, and Native Americans, we 
can separately appreciate the Constitution’s provisions for dividing power 
and protecting rights, and the intellectual history that created the 
environment in which concerns about abuse of power could be sufficiently 
incorporated into a foundational legal document.  The principles and text 
at the heart of American government can inspire us and serve as a source of 
enduring truth about political life, despite and because of the flaws of the 
Framers.  Men are not angels, wrote Madison219—nor were he and his 
associates.  Only with vigilance can their mistakes be corrected and 
victories preserved.  That is the narrative that matters, and in that narrative 
 
 217 William H. Gass, The Death of the Author, SALMAGUNDI, Fall 1984, at 3.  
 218 Id. at 11. 
 219 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001) (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”). 
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the text stands apart from the authors. 
2.  Breaking from Historical Associations 
Emphasizing the Constitution as a symbol of the ongoing struggle 
towards justice offers one way to contextualize how the Constitution, and 
American society, alienated and disenfranchised much of its population in 
the past.  But the “ongoing struggle” narrative can only partially address the 
antipathy many people of color and white women have towards originalism 
and the Constitution in the present.  There are other present-day sources of 
alienation, which originalists can recognize and orient away from.  
Let’s consider alienation from originalism in a broader, cultural context.  
Originalism is closely associated with conservative, libertarian, and 
Republican ideas.  Although not strictly related to constitutional 
interpretation, conservatives, libertarians, and Republicans are sometimes 
publicly perceived as holding negative attitudes or beliefs about women and 
racial minorities, partly because of the ways in which some conservatives, 
libertarians, and Republicans talk about them in the context of public 
issues.  To provide one example, Jacob Levy recently wrote an essay about 
the ways members of the libertarian movement expressed greater anxieties 
over programs that provided welfare to black Americans than programs 
impacting other groups: 
Think about the different ways that market liberals and libertarians talk 
about “welfare” from how they talk about other kinds of government 
redistribution.  There’s no talk of the culture of dependence among 
farmers, although they receive far more government aid per capita than do 
the urban poor. . . .  But once the imagined typical welfare recipient was a 
black mother, welfare became a matter not just of economic or 
constitutional concern but of moral panic about parasites, fraud, and the 
long-term collapse of self-reliance.220 
Levy makes a key insight—that even when one holds a general, cross-
cutting position (e.g., government welfare is bad, regardless of who receives 
it), much is revealed by how one chooses to talk about that belief.  When 
one bemoans the welfare state, but focuses emotional ire more on 
individual black welfare recipients than on predominantly white farmers, 
many black Americans will hear the statements and reasonably conclude, 
“This person is racist,” rather than “This person dislikes welfare.”  
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But Levy’s essay also suggests that, despite its historic associations, 
originalism need not disproportionally appeal to white Americans and to 
men. He writes analogously about free-market politics,  
[L]ibertarian, individualist, and market-liberal ideas, concepts, slogans, and 
advocates aren’t alone in having a history that is entangled with white 
supremacy.  Hardly any set of social ideas in American intellectual history 
lacks such an entanglement.  This is as true of the technocratic 
progressivism associated with the racist Woodrow Wilson as it is of the 
populist democracy associated with the racist Andrew Jackson. . . .  There’s 
no good reason to sever “democracy” or “progressivism” from their 
complicated genealogies while tying “federalism” or “freedom of 
association” to theirs.221 
And yet, in recent decades, progressives have largely been effective at 
separating progressive ideas from their unseemly history, while 
Republicanism and capitalism are increasingly associated with themes of 
racial subordination.  This present-day phenomenon illustrates a vital 
insight.  We choose today whether progressive, liberal, libertarian, and 
conservative values are associated with a racist and sexist past, in how we 
talk about them, and through what particulars we emphasize and de-
emphasize.  We choose today whether originalism is associated with the 
racist and sexist values of the founding-era public, by how we talk about the 
legitimacy of originalist methods and the consequences of originalist 
interpretation.  
Originalism de-associates from the sexist and racist beliefs of the 1790s 
when its positive implications for women and people of color are made 
explicit, and when the role of women and people of color in determining 
constitutional meaning is acknowledged.  This happens when Chris Green 
writes that “[o]nly originalism” guarantees that a woman can 
constitutionally run for president, because at the time of the framing, the 
gender-nonspecific use of “he” was common.222  This happens when Jamie 
Fox tries to understand how black Americans used language that appears in 
the Reconstruction Amendments,223 and when Randy Barnett emphasizes 
the importance of the abolitionist movement to securing the rights of “We 
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the People—each and every one.”224 By extension, originalism is 
undermined when supporters of an individual right to bear arms express 
profound concerns about particular white Americans’ rights being 
protected, but fail to rally when a police officer shoots and kills a black man 
who had informed the officer that he was legally carrying a gun.225 
Incorporating women and people of color more intentionally into the 
narrative about originalism is both difficult and worthwhile.  It is difficult 
because there are literally thousands of relevant actors—people who talk 
about originalism, but also other individuals active in politics or policy-
making whose views are associated with and bundled up with originalists’ 
views in the public perception.  Each individual’s efforts only have a small 
effect on the larger cultural impression.  But this effort is nonetheless 
worthwhile, regardless of whether anyone notices.  Originalism strives to be 
unbiased in its application of the law, to instantiate “rule of law” values, 
and to treat like cases alike; by carefully considering how one reacts when 
issues affect people of different demographics, one can further improve how 
accurately one applies constitutional provisions to relevant cases. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has worked to advance several objectives.  First, it has 
worked to identify and articulate the concerns women and people of color 
might have about embracing originalism,226 and to explore alternative 
perspectives for understanding the originalist enterprise that might resonate 
with a more diverse population.227  Second, it has argued that originalism 
stands to benefit as an interpretive methodology significantly by including 
more diverse voices in the present and from the past.228  We all bring our 
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own experiences and expectations to any interpretive enterprise, but by 
embracing and encouraging the participation of more diverse voices, we 
have a greater opportunity to triangulate among each other’s 
interpretations and unearth more accurate claims about original meaning.  
Third, in order to jumpstart this process, this Article has tried to highlight 
particular historic speakers whose perspectives may be valuable to the 
discovery and analysis of original public meaning.229 
A reader weary of today’s political climate might have worked through 
each of the concerns and remedies suggested by this Article and thought 
that taking these steps will not create many converts to originalism.  
Positions are too polarized; partisans are too skeptical of the intentions of 
their opponents.  But the goal of this Article is not to convince non-
originalists to “swim the Tiber.”  Rather, the aim of this Article has been to 
consider and take seriously non-originalists’ race- and gender-related 
concerns about originalism.  By identifying valid and compelling concerns 
held by non-originalists, originalists can become better at accessing the 
original meaning of the Constitution and more accurately and objectively 
understand it themselves. 
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